Orange Cyberdefense | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

Between crossovers - Do threat actors play dirty or desperate? In our dataset of over 11,000 victim organizations that have experienced a Cyber Extortion / Ransomware attack, we noticed that some victims re-occur. Consequently, the question arises why we observe a re-victimization and whether or not this is an actual second attack, an affiliate crossover (meaning an affiliate has gone to another Cyber Extortion operation with the same victim) or stolen data that has been travelling and re-(mis-)used. Either way, for the victims neither is good news.  But first thing's first, let's explore the current threat landscape, dive into one of our most recent research focuses on the dynamics of this ecosystem; and then explore our dataset on Law Enforcement activities in this space. Might the re-occurrence that we observe be foul play by threat actors and thus show how desperately they are trying to regain the trust of their co-offenders after disruption efforts by Law Enforcement? Or are th

In the past 2 years, we have observed a significant surge in hacktivism activity due to ongoing wars and geopolitical conflicts in various regions. Since the war against Ukraine began, we have witnessed a notable mobilization of non-state and state-backed actors alike, forming new groups or joining existing hacker collectives.  We understand hacktivism as a form of computer hacking that is done to further the goals of political or social  activism 1 . While  activism  describes a normal, non-disruptive use of the Internet in order to support a specific cause (online petitions, fundraising, coordinating activities),  hacktivism  includes operations that use hacking techniques with the intent to disrupt but not to cause serious harm (e.g., data theft, website defacements, redirects, Denial-of-Service attacks). Cyber operations that inherit a willingness or intent to cause harm to physical property, severe economic damage or loss of life would be referred to as  cyberterrorism, 2, 3  Th

As a vCISO, you are responsible for your client's cybersecurity strategy and risk governance. This incorporates multiple disciplines, from research to execution to reporting. Recently, we published a comprehensive playbook for vCISOs, "Your First 100 Days as a vCISO – 5 Steps to Success" , which covers all the phases entailed in launching a successful vCISO engagement, along with recommended actions to take, and step-by-step examples.  Following the success of the playbook and the requests that have come in from the MSP/MSSP community, we decided to drill down into specific parts of vCISO reporting and provide more color and examples. In this article, we focus on how to create compelling narratives within a report, which has a significant impact on the overall MSP/MSSP value proposition.  This article brings the highlights of a recent guided workshop we held, covering what makes a successful report and how it can be used to enhance engagement with your cyber security clients.

Threat actors are leveraging a recently disclosed security flaw impacting Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA gateways to deploy a backdoor codenamed  DSLog  on susceptible devices. That's according to  findings  from Orange Cyberdefense, which said it observed the exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 within hours of the public release of the proof-the-concept (PoC) code. CVE-2024-21893, which was  disclosed  by Ivanti late last month alongside CVE-2024-21888, refers to a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SAML module that, if successfully exploited, could permit access to otherwise restricted resources sans any authentication. The Utah-based company has since acknowledged that the flaw has limited targeted attacks, although the exact scale of the compromises is unclear. Then, last week, the Shadowserver Foundation  revealed  a surge in exploitation attempts targeting the vulnerability originating from over 170 unique IP addresses, shortly after both

We analyzed 2,5 million vulnerabilities we discovered in our customer's assets. This is what we found. Digging into the data The dataset we analyze here is representative of a subset of clients that subscribe to our vulnerability scanning services. Assets scanned include those reachable across the Internet, as well as those present on internal networks. The data includes findings for network equipment, desktops, web servers, database servers, and even the odd document printer or scanning device. The number of organizations in this dataset is smaller (3 less) than the previous dataset used in last year's Security Navigator 2023 and some organizations were replaced by new additions. With the change of organizations comes a different mix of assets, which leaves comparing the previous results akin to comparing apples to oranges (we might be biased), but it's still worth noting similar patterns where possible. This year, we revisit the menacing vulnerability theme with an eye on

Humans are complex beings with consciousness, emotions, and the capacity to act based on thoughts. In the ever-evolving realm of cybersecurity, humans consistently remain primary targets for attackers. Over the years, these attackers have developed their expertise in exploiting various human qualities, sharpening their skills to manipulate biases and emotional triggers with the objective of influencing human behaviour to compromise security whether it be personal and organisational security.  More than just a 'human factor' Understanding what defines our humanity, recognizing how our qualities can be perceived as vulnerabilities, and comprehending how our minds can be targeted provide the foundation for identifying and responding when we inevitably become the target. The human mind is a complex landscape that evolved over years of exposure to the natural environment, interactions with others, and lessons drawn from past experiences. As humans, our minds set us apart, marke

In last year's edition of the  Security Navigator  we noted that the Manufacturing Industry appeared to be totally over-represented in our dataset of Cyber Extortion victims. Neither the number of businesses nor their average revenue particularly stood out to explain this. Manufacturing was also the most represented Industry in our CyberSOC dataset – contributing more Incidents than any other sector.  We found this trend confirmed in 2023 – so much in fact that we decided to take a closer look. So let's examine some possible explanations.  And debunk them. Hunting for possible explanations Manufacturing is still the most impacted industry in our Cyber Extortion dataset in 2023, as tracked by monitoring double-extortion leak sites. Indeed, this sector now represents more than 20% of all victims since we started observing the leak sites in the beginning of 2020. Approximately 28% of all our clients are from Manufacturing, contributing with an overall share of 31% of all p

The recently published Security Navigator report of Orange Cyberdefense shows there has been a  rapid increase of attacks on industrial control systems (ICS) in the past few years. Looking a bit closer, most of the attacks seem to have spilt over from traditional IT. That's to be expected, as production systems are commonly connected to ordinary corporate networks at this point.  Though the data does not indicate at this point that a lot of threat actors specifically target industrial systems – in fact, most evidence points to purely opportunistic behaviour – the tide could turn any time, once the added complexity of compromising OT environments promises to pay off. Criminals will take any chance they get to blackmail victims into extortion schemes, and halting production can cause immense damage. It is likely only a matter of time. So cybersecurity for operational technology (OT) is vitally important.  Deception is an effective option to improve threat detection and response ca