Identity and Access Management | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

Identity and access management (IAM) services provider Okta has warned of a spike in the "frequency and scale" of credential stuffing attacks aimed at online services. These unprecedented attacks, observed over the last month, are said to be facilitated by "the broad availability of residential proxy services, lists of previously stolen credentials ('combo lists'), and scripting tools," the company  said  in an alert published Saturday. The findings build on a  recent advisory  from Cisco, which cautioned of a global surge in brute-force attacks targeting various devices, including Virtual Private Network (VPN) services, web application authentication interfaces, and SSH services, since at least March 18, 2024. "These attacks all appear to be originating from TOR exit nodes and a range of other anonymizing tunnels and proxies," Talos noted at the time, adding targets of the attacks comprise VPN appliances from Cisco, Check Point, Fortinet, Soni

Identities now transcend human boundaries. Within each line of code and every API call lies a non-human identity. These entities act as programmatic access keys, enabling authentication and facilitating interactions among systems and services, which are essential for every API call, database query, or storage account access. As we depend on multi-factor authentication and passwords to safeguard human identities, a pressing question arises: How do we guarantee the security and integrity of these non-human counterparts? How do we authenticate, authorize, and regulate access for entities devoid of life but crucial for the functioning of critical systems? Let's break it down. The challenge Imagine a cloud-native application as a bustling metropolis of tiny neighborhoods known as microservices, all neatly packed into containers. These microservices function akin to diligent worker bees, each diligently performing its designated task, be it processing data, verifying credentials, or

As a vCISO, you are responsible for your client's cybersecurity strategy and risk governance. This incorporates multiple disciplines, from research to execution to reporting. Recently, we published a comprehensive playbook for vCISOs, "Your First 100 Days as a vCISO – 5 Steps to Success" , which covers all the phases entailed in launching a successful vCISO engagement, along with recommended actions to take, and step-by-step examples.  Following the success of the playbook and the requests that have come in from the MSP/MSSP community, we decided to drill down into specific parts of vCISO reporting and provide more color and examples. In this article, we focus on how to create compelling narratives within a report, which has a significant impact on the overall MSP/MSSP value proposition.  This article brings the highlights of a recent guided workshop we held, covering what makes a successful report and how it can be used to enhance engagement with your cyber security clients.

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a new attack technique called  Silver SAML  that can be successful even in cases where mitigations have been applied against Golden SAML attacks. Silver SAML "enables the exploitation of SAML to launch attacks from an identity provider like Entra ID against applications configured to use it for authentication, such as Salesforce," Semperis researchers Tomer Nahum and Eric Woodruff  said  in a report shared with The Hacker News. Golden SAML (short for  Security Assertion Markup Language ) was  first documented  by CyberArk in 2017. The attack vector, in a nutshell, entails the abuse of the interoperable authentication standard to impersonate almost any identity in an organization. It's also similar to the  Golden Ticket attack  in that it grants attackers the ability to gain unauthorized access to any service in a federation with any privileges and to stay persistent in this environment in a stealthy manner. "Golden SAML introduces to a fed

IT professionals have developed a sophisticated understanding of the enterprise attack surface – what it is, how to quantify it and how to manage it.  The process is simple: begin by thoroughly assessing the attack surface, encompassing the entire IT environment. Identify all potential entry and exit points where unauthorized access could occur. Strengthen these vulnerable points using available market tools and expertise to achieve the desired cybersecurity posture.  While conceptually straightforward, this is an incredibly tedious task that consumes the working hours of CISOs and their organizations. Both the enumeration and the fortification pose challenges: large organizations use a vast array of technologies, such as server and endpoint platforms, network devices, and business apps. Reinforcing each of these components becomes a frustrating exercise in integration with access control, logging, patching, monitoring, and more, creating a seemingly endless list of tasks.  However

Threat actors can take advantage of Amazon Web Services Security Token Service (AWS STS) as a way to infiltrate cloud accounts and conduct follow-on attacks. The service enables threat actors to impersonate user identities and roles in cloud environments, Red Canary researchers Thomas Gardner and Cody Betsworth  said  in a Tuesday analysis. AWS STS is a  web service  that enables users to request temporary, limited-privilege credentials for users to access AWS resources without needing to create an AWS identity. These STS tokens can be valid  anywhere from 15 minutes to 36 hours . Threat actors can steal long-term IAM tokens through a variety of methods like malware infections, publicly exposed credentials, and phishing emails, subsequently using them to determine roles and privileges associated with those tokens via API calls. "Depending on the token's permission level, adversaries may also be able to use it to create additional IAM users with long-term AKIA tokens to e

New findings have shed light on what's said to be a lawful attempt to covertly intercept traffic originating from jabber[.]ru (aka xmpp[.]ru), an  XMPP -based instant messaging service, via servers hosted on Hetzner and Linode (a subsidiary of Akamai) in Germany. "The attacker has issued several new TLS certificates using Let's Encrypt service which were used to hijack encrypted  STARTTLS connections  on port 5222 using transparent [man-in-the-middle] proxy," a security researcher who goes by the alias ValdikSS  said  earlier this week. "The attack was discovered due to the expiration of one of the MiTM certificates, which haven't been reissued." Evidence gathered so far points to the traffic redirection being configured on the hosting provider network, ruling out other possibilities, such as a server breach or a spoofing attack. The wiretapping is estimated to have lasted for as long as six months, from April 18, 2023, although it's been confi