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Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a critical vulnerability in OpenAI's ChatGPT Workspace Agents that could have allowed a single phishing link to stealthily build, authorize, and deploy an autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agent inside a victim's organization. The vulnerability has been codenamed AgentForger by Zenity Labs. The issue has since been addressed by OpenAI as of June 8, 2026, following responsible disclosure. "A single link could hijack OpenAI's ChatGPT Agent Builder to stand up an attacker-controlled AI agent with a real employee's access and its approvals switched off," the AI security company said in a two-part report shared with The Hacker News. The attack occurs when an unsuspecting employee clicks open a benign-looking ChatGPT link, causing it to spawn a new AI agent within the company's trust boundary that does the attacker's bidding. The issue is a case of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) that forges an attack...

A crafted SVG submitted to Bing's image search ran commands as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Microsoft's production image-processing workers, and as root on the Linux machines in the same fleet. XBOW's testing got the same result on workers across different hosts and network ranges, so the problem sat in Bing's image tier, not on one bad machine. Microsoft issued two critical CVEs, CVE-2026-32194 and CVE-2026-32191, and rated both 9.8 on the CVSS scale. XBOW, the autonomous offensive security startup, found both and reported them privately. Bing users have no patch or mitigation to apply: Microsoft fixed both server-side before the advisories went out in March, and the records state there is "no customer action to resolve." Neither advisory recorded exploitation or public disclosure when they went up on March 19. XBOW published the exploit mechanics on July 23, after holding them back at Microsoft's request until the remediation had landed. What outlive...

AI agent security is moving through a familiar maturity curve: adoption, then visibility, and finally, control. But what we've collectively discovered is that enforcing least privilege for AI agents is harder than we ever imagined. This is why there are so many approaches, from prompt filtering to identity-layer access controls. Where we've collectively landed is that understanding the intent of AI agents is essential to securing them. It's not easy, but it's the only path forward. Organizations approach this challenge with different levels of sophistication. For many, the current goal is simply to find the AI agents already operating across the business. That is a necessary first step. AI agents are appearing in SaaS platforms, developer environments, cloud workflows, customer support systems, productivity tools, and internal applications. Some are sanctioned, and others are not. But discovery alone isn't useful. AI agents are not passive; they reason, plan, c...

Someone installed a popular AI assistant on a rented server, switched off the setting that makes it ask permission before running risky commands, and pointed it at Thailand's Ministry of Finance, which runs the country's treasury and tax collection. The agent then worked through the ministry's network on its own, checking hosts for ways to gain root access, hunting through file systems, and crawling a folder of staff personnel records going back to 2012. The operator left the agent's own logs sitting on a web server with directory listing switched on, where threat intelligence firm Hunt.io and researcher Bob Diachenko found them, along with 585 files and 470 MB of attack tooling. The tool is Hermes , an open-source assistant from Nous Research that people install to manage their mail, run chores, and take instructions over Telegram or Slack. It is not a hacking tool, and nothing here is a flaw in it. The mode the operator used, called YOLO, is a documented feat...

The threat actors behind the Golden Chickens malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem have resurfaced with four new malware families, indicating that the operators are showing no signs of stopping despite extensive public disclosures into their inner workings. The malware families in question are: TinyEgg, ChonkyChicken, a modularized variant of ChonkyChicken, and a modified web browser credential theft utility codenamed ChromEggscalator. Recorded Future's Insikt Group is tracking the group under the moniker TAG-195. TAG-195 is a financially motivated malware-as-a-service (MaaS) developer whose tooling has been previously linked to TAG-127 as an operator and customer. The threat intelligence company said it has also observed TAG-127 deploying TinyEgg via ClickFix-style social engineering campaigns that trick unsuspecting users into manually executing malicious commands. "The four new families indicate an architectural transition and evolution in the TAG-195 MaaS ecosys...

Eight security flaws in NodeBB went public on Wednesday, along with the code to exploit them. Aikido Security rates all eight as high severity and says its AI pentest agents found them in a six-hour review of the forum software's source code. Every version before 4.14.0 is affected. NodeBB has fixed them all, and administrators should be on 4.14.2. The simplest one takes a settings change. A regular forum member could point their homepage setting at the admin address, reload the page, and the admin dashboard opened for them. No password, no exploit code. The forum's own interface blocks that setting, but the block only ran in the browser and could be sidestepped. Most of what a member could then reach was read-only, including the error log and any user list an admin had exported, though they could also swap the site logo. Two more gave an attacker with no account at all access to things meant to be private. One let anyone claim to be any user and read private messages...

Redis shipped seven security releases on July 23 after researchers published authenticated RCE PoCs for stock Redis 6.2.22, 7.4.9, 8.6.4, and 8.8.0. All four chains require RESTORE. The Streams chains also need EVAL and XGROUP; the 8.8.0 chain needs EVAL and the bundled RedisBloom module. Redis says the underlying memory flaws may lead to remote code execution . Redis 6.2.23, 7.2.15, and 7.4.10 fix the Streams shared-NACK use-after-free; Redis 8.2.8, 8.4.5, and 8.6.5 fix both the Streams issue and the RedisBloom and TDigest out-of-bounds writes; Redis 8.8.1 fixes the RedisBloom and TDigest loaders, while the Streams guard was already present in Redis 8.8.0. Two PoC targets, Redis 6.2.22 and 7.4.9, were the May security updates Redis told users to install, but those releases did not include the shared-NACK ownership guard. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed branch. Until then, revoke RESTORE from accounts that do not strictly need it and block untrusted network acce...

The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has warned of a new campaign that involves the use of a malicious program that's dressed up as a Notepad++ plugin to compromise Windows systems. The activity has been attributed by the agency to a threat cluster it tracks as UAC-0099 , a Russia-aligned group that has previously observed weaponizing security flaws in WinRAR software to deliver a malware strain called LONEPAGE. Other cyber attacks mounted by the adversary have employed phishing emails as an initial access method to deploy MATCHBOIL, MATCHWOK, and DRAGSTARE. It's known to be active since at least mid-2022. The latest set of attacks begins, observed earlier this summer, with a phishing email containing an image attachment, which, when clicked, opens a URL that's concealed using a link shortener from where the request is sent to a file-sharing service like EasySend[.]co to retrieve a ZIP archive. The ZIP file contains a Visual Basic Script (VBSc...

A Russian state-supported espionage group spent months reading Western mailboxes through a then-unknown flaw in Zimbra's webmail client. The payload goes after the last 90 days of email, the organization's entire email directory, the password saved in the browser and the codes kept for two-factor recovery. Opening the message was enough to start it. The NSA , CISA and partner agencies published a joint advisory on the campaign Thursday, alongside research from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 and Proofpoint. The advisory calls the technique "a view-based exploit that only requires a user to view a malicious email" in a vulnerable client. It says the actors have been targeting and compromising Western government and commercial organizations through Zimbra since at least July 2025. The flaw, CVE-2025-66376 , is a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in Zimbra's Classic UI. A crafted HTML email abuses CSS @import handling to execute JavaScript inside a...

Most of this week's trouble came dressed as something useful. A package stole data. A fake extension opened remote access. A safety app became spyware. An image gave hidden orders to an AI agent. Other threats hid in open systems, weak code, and normal network traffic. The threats change every week. Subscribe, and we’ll alert you when each new ThreatsDay Bulletin is out. The danger was easy to miss because it looked ordinary. Here is the full list:

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a sandbox escape vulnerability in Anthropic's Claude Cowork that makes it possible to break out of the confines of a Linux virtual machine (VM) within which the agent runs to read or write files anywhere on the Mac. Accomplish AI, which shared details of the vulnerability with The Hacker News ahead of publication, said about 500,000 macOS users running local Cowork sessions were affected prior to it being patched. It has been codenamed SharedRoot . "We connected a folder to a fresh Claude Cowork session, sent one short message, and watched the agent escape the sandbox," Oren Yomtov, principal security researcher at Accomplish AI, said . "From inside the VM, it reached the host Mac and read and wrote files all over it, far outside the folder we'd connected, with no permission prompt anywhere." With this level of access, the agent can access any data stored on the Mac via the user's account, including SSH ke...

The Chaos ransomware group ran its command-and-control through the victim's own browser. Cisco Talos on Thursday detailed msaRAT , the Rust implant behind it, found on a compromised Windows machine ahead of the encryptor. The implant never opens an outbound connection of its own. Its process talks to 127.0.0.1 and nothing else. It starts Chrome or Edge in headless mode and drives the browser over the Chrome DevTools Protocol, the browser's own debugging API. Every C2 message travels out from there through a WebRTC data channel relayed by Twilio's TURN service, so what a defender sees on the wire is a browser calling Cloudflare and Twilio. The attacker's own server address never appears at all. Chrome Does the Talking msaRAT looks for Chrome or Edge through environment variables first, then falls back to the registry for Chrome. If no matching browser is found, the CDP path is skipped. When it finds one, it starts the browser without a visible window using -...

An exposed Alibaba Cloud server has revealed a China-nexus operation that Group-IB tracks as JadeProx . The cluster has targeted government, healthcare, and education organizations across Asia and Latin America with a previously undocumented Windows loader called TriBack Loader. Group-IB found the server in mid-April 2026 in Alibaba Cloud's Singapore region; it was offline by the time the report published on July 23, 2026. Its bash history, phishing packages, post-exploitation tools, and webshell paths laid the operation out: active intrusions against a Vietnamese public hospital's medical imaging system and Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scanning and exploitation follow-up against Hong Kong education infrastructure, and a spear-phishing package addressed to the National Congress of Honduras. The operators reached the hospital's imaging server through webshells planted on an exposed Java management interface. One Loader, Four Builds TriBack Loader a...

Most people understand identity theft as an attacker stealing a real person's sensitive information and impersonating them. Synthetic identity fraud is much harder to catch. Instead of stealing a real identity, the attacker manufactures a new one, frankensteining together several real data points with fabricated ones to create a person who doesn't exist. Since no real victim monitors misuse, a fake identity can silently accumulate permissions and credibility over time before it's ever detected. This same principle has a largely unexplored parallel with Non-Human Identities (NHIs). Security teams are spending significant effort to protect NHIs from being stolen. Still, the machine-side equivalent of synthetic identity fraud is rarely discussed: identities that were never legitimately provisioned from the start. Following this approach, an attacker doesn't hijack an existing service account but instead fabricates one, blending real environmental attributes with fake o...