Vulnerability | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), on Thursday, added a critical security flaw impacting Fortinet FortiMail to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities ( KEV ) catalog, following reports of active exploitation. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-104286 (CVSS score: 9.8), allows unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary files on the underlying system. "An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') [CWE-22] and improper neutralization of NULL byte or NULL character [CWE-158] vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files on the underlying system via crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests," Fortinet said in an advisory. The vulnerability impacts the following versions - FortiMail 8.0.0 through 8.0.1 (Upgrade to upcoming 8.0.2 or above) FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.6 (Upgrade to upcoming 7.6.7 or above) FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.8 (Upgrade to upcoming 7.4.9 or a...

This week, the useful words are boring ones: inspect, cache, compile, store, trust. Each sounds harmless. Each can become an attack path when a system does a little more than people expect. A model check can run code. A cache can mix up requests. A public secret can stay useful for years. That is the lesson running through the list. Attackers do not always need a brilliant new trick. They can hide commands in public infrastructure, reuse old flaws, abuse weak defaults, or let automation stitch together a rough path that still works. Faster tools are changing the pace, but basic mistakes are still doing plenty of the work. So the interesting question this week is not “what broke?” It is “what did we assume was safe because it looked ordinary?” The full list has answers. The threats change every week. Subscribe, and we’ll alert you when each new ThreatsDay Bulletin is out.

Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on a WordPress compromise in which threat actors deployed multiple persistence mechanisms to ensure that the final payload kept returning without having to infect the site again. The backdoor has been codenamed SC after the "SC_" markers present in the injected content. Sucuri has described the malware as a "self-healing mesh" that's blockchain-controlled. "The payload lives in at least eight places at once, spread across files, the database, and shared memory, and every one of those places can rebuild all the others," security researcher Gabriel Barbosa said . "Delete the plugin and a drop-in rewrites it. Delete the drop-in and the theme rewrites it. Clean every file on disk, and the next page load restores the whole set from the database or from a shared-memory segment. The result is a circular system with no single point you can remove to stop it." According to Sucuri, the malware does no...

Every security leader at a bank, insurer, or asset manager has had a version of this conversation: Security wants to eliminate a class of vulnerabilities. Engineering explains what it would take to upgrade the platform where they live. Somebody prices out the regression testing. Somebody else raises the change-freeze calendar. The finding gets an exception, a compensating control, and a date eighteen months out on the roadmap to address it. Nobody in that conversation is being unreasonable. Financial services carry more legacy software than almost any other industry for a few reasons: decades of accumulated infrastructure, regulatory obligations that reward stability, and applications where an hour of downtime is unacceptable. In that environment, minimizing change is risk management. Every dependency bump, every base image swap, every migration is a chance to break something that clears trades or moves money. So the instinct to stick to the status quo has been sound. The problem...

OpenAI on Wednesday said it identified and disrupted a coordinated distillation campaign that was designed to illicitly extract protected reasoning from its artificial intelligence (AI) models. A "core cluster of the activity," going back to the first week of July, has been attributed to individuals associated with Moonshot AI, a Chinese AI company based in Beijing. It did not cite any technical evidence to back this assessment, likely owing to security reasons. "The operators did not break our encryption, compromise a database, or gain direct access to stored user conversations," OpenAI said . "Instead, they manipulated model interactions so that protected reasoning could be reproduced in forms visible to the requester in a coordinated, scaled manner that violated our terms of service." The activity is said to have begun on July 1, 2026, initially at a low volume before it spiked on July 24 and 25, 2026, to 16,000 attempted requests using a relevan...