Ebury | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

A Russian man accused of infecting tens of thousands of computer servers worldwide to generate millions in illicit profit has finally entered a guilty plea in the United States and is going to face sentencing in August. Maxim Senakh, 41, of Velikii Novgorod, Russia, pleaded guilty in a US federal court on Tuesday for his role in the development and maintenance of the infamous Linux botnet known as Ebury that siphoned millions of dollars from victims worldwide. Senakh, who was detained by Finland in August 2015 and extradition to the US in January 2016, admitted to installing Ebury malware on computer servers worldwide, including thousands in the United States. First spotted in 2011, Ebury is an SSH backdoor Trojan for Linux and Unix-style operating systems, like FreeBSD or Solaris, which infected more than 500,000 computers and 25,000 dedicated servers in a worldwide malware campaign called ' Operation Windigo .' Ebury backdoor gives attackers full shell control of

In late 2013, Security Researchers identified thousands of Linux systems around the world infected with the OpenSSH b ackdoor trojan and  credential stealer  named Linux/Ebury ,  that allows  unauthorized access of an affected computer to the remote attackers. Antivirus Firm ESET's Reseacher team has been tracking and  investigating the operation behind Linux/Ebury and today team  uncovers the details [ Report PDF ] of a massive,  sophisticated and organized  malware campaign called ' Operation Windigo ', infected more than 500,000 computers and 25,000 dedicated servers. ' We discovered an infrastructure used for malicious activities that is all hosted on compromised servers. We were also able to find a link between different malware components such as Linux/Cdorked, Perl/Calfbot and Win32/Glupteba.M and realized they are all operated by the same group. '  ESET reported. Malware used in Operation Windigo: Linux/Ebury –  an OpenSSH backdoor use

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