Artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and logistics sectors across Europe and the U.S. have emerged as the target of a large-scale, industrialized campaign dubbed Trigram.
"Trigram is a large-scale campaign that impersonates about 50 brands in the blockchain and AI sectors, to trick developers into executing an infostealer themselves," Stormshield said in a deep-dive technical report published Monday.
"Three social engineering scenarios (recruitment, conference, and package tracking), a software supply-chain compromise, and trojanized code repositories all converge on the same infrastructure and the same payload."
The activity is assessed to share similarities with intrusion sets linked to North Korea, particularly Kimsuky and UNK_DeadDrop. Some aspects of this campaign have been previously documented by Proofpoint, SafeDep, Jamf, and Genians Security Center.
It's worth noting that the cluster tracked as UNK_DeadDrop exhibits similarities with a long-running North Korea-aligned campaign referred to as Contagious Interview. It employs phishing emails using developer role recruitment or code review themes to target developers across finance, cryptocurrency, education, and technology sectors to deploy an information stealer.
On Linux and macOS systems, the attack chains lead to the deployment of Overlord, an open-source remote access trojan (RAT) framework to facilitate data theft.
Then, in August 2026, Jamf Threat Labs disclosed details of a macOS campaign using a fake Zoom installer to deploy Overlord RAT, although the Apple device management company said at the time that it found no "direct overlap" between the activity and UNK_DeadDrop.
"The Overlord variant observed here shares a LaunchAgent label (com.zoom) and plist name (com.zoom.plist) with FlexibleFerret, a DPRK-attributed macOS malware family associated with the Contagious Interview campaign," it added.
Overlord has also been distributed as recently as late October 2026 via another channel: a forged commit in the antd-img-crop GitHub repository that installs the malware by means of a prebuild hook ("prebuild.js") as soon as a developer runs the "npm run build" command. The npm package in itself was not impacted.
The JavaScript payload is designed to download and run a fake installer that sets up Node.js and fetches an encrypted JavaScript next-stage that runs entirely in memory and locates its command-and-control (C2) server via a GitLab dead drop. The third-stage malware is responsible for harvesting credentials and installing the OverLord framework.
"The malware steals browser passwords, cookies, keychains, cryptocurrency wallets, SSH keys and .env files on macOS, Linux and Windows, then installs a remote-access agent disguised as Google software," SafeDep said in an analysis of the malware.
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| The forged commit pushed to "antd-img-crop" on October 31, 2026 |
On macOS and Linux systems, it also displays a fake dialog asking users to enter their system password so as to "apply system updates and verify drivers and security settings." Interestingly, the same payload is delivered via two other initial access vectors -
- A fake careers portal impersonating Amber Group, a legitimate cryptocurrency firm
- A sideloaded Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) or Cursor extension named "google-dev-tools.google-update-support" that's likely launched via a coding assessment and deleted after it's run
"The fake recruiter, the paste-a-command 'verification' step and the focus on developers and cryptocurrency holders match the publicly documented Contagious Interview campaign," SafeDep said. "The match rests on technique and does not prove who the operators are."
The third branch of the campaign revolves around another cluster tracked by Genians as Operation GitPower. Attributed to the Kimsuky group, the activity involves operating local large language model (LLM) environments using Ollama and GPT4All to generate decoy documents and use them to target professionals and organizations in the fields of policy, academia, international cooperation, diplomacy, and security research.
Present within the phishing email is a Windows Shortcut (LNK) that, once launched, runs PowerShell code designed to retrieve the lure document via GitHub's raw content service and open it, while stealthily downloading additional payloads like AsyncRAT in the background.
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| Kimsuky's use of GitHub for C2 |
The campaign has since evolved to target Ukrainian experts in diplomacy, security, and international policy, utilizing international conference invitations and requests for analytical collaboration to elicit responses from targets and eventually distribute malware in the form of ZIP archives containing malicious LNK files.
In at least one case, the phishing emails have been found to trick recipients into clicking on bogus links to harvest their Google account credentials under the pretext of joining a Zoom meeting via Gmail. Another method involves distributing a counterfeit version of a Zoom installer that, in addition to installing the legitimate app, runs malware designed to run arbitrary PowerShell scripts and send the results back.
"This attack is particularly noteworthy as it indicates that Kimsuky has expanded its targeting scope beyond its traditional focus on South Korea to include key individuals in Ukraine," Genians noted last month, adding these efforts were mostly unsuccessful.
"Kimsuky's attacks against Ukraine may be cyber espionage operations aimed at collecting information on the war, the extent of North Korean troop losses, developments in the questioning and handling of prisoners of war, and the details of consultations between South Korea and Ukraine."
The latest findings from Stormshield merge together all of these separate findings into a single, cohesive picture - a toolset comprising a management platform, victim-tracking consoles, and email-delivery infrastructure. The attack chain is a single infection chain that's adapted for three environments -
- Send the target an email advertising a job opportunity, entice them into clicking a link, and initiate the "recruitment" process.
- The website masquerades as a recruitment platform where visitors can view job listings and submit job applications.
- In the background, the web page fingerprints the visitor and uses an IP address-based geofencing mechanism to lock out users from specific regions (possibly China). If access is restricted, users are served a stripped-down version of the home page without any ability to interact with it.
- If the "applicant" satisfies the filtering criteria, they are served an application form to enter their personal details.
- The user is then prompted to enter a referral (or invitation) code, indicating that the campaign is aimed at pre-identified targets rather than a broad audience. If the code is rejected, the site displays one of three messages: "Already used," "Locked to another IP," and "Invalid code."
- If the code is accepted, the candidate is served a confirmation message and is instructed to copy and run a command on the Linux terminal as part of a technical check.
- Once the command is run, it sends the "nonce" information displayed on the web page to a remote server via an HTTP POST request. No file or script is downloaded or executed on the victim machine at this stage.
- The web page, which is waiting for confirmation from the server, responds with an error message, stating: "Operation timeout. Please try again. Nonce Refreshed."
- The attack moves to the second stage when the web page displays the same verification screen but with a modified "Copy" button behavior that injects the malicious command directly into the victim's clipboard. The same pattern is observed even when the target uses the "Ctrl+C" keyboard shortcut to copy the command from the web page.
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The actual command that gets executed depends on the operating system -
- On Windows, it launches PowerShell to download and run a file named "v.cmd"
- On Linux, it launches bash shell to download and run a file named "u"
- On macOS, it launches bash shell to download and run a file named "verify_m”
"These scripts act as loaders: they prepare the execution environment, retrieve the necessary components, and launch a JavaScript payload, install_guard.js, fetched from a remote server," the French cybersecurity company explained.
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| Trigram dropper execution phase |
This preparatory stage also involves extracting a Base64-encoded script that configures the working directory, establishes a locking mechanism to prevent concurrent installations, and checks for an existing Node.js installation.
If a compatible version (minimum version 18) is not found, it proceeds to download and install Node.js version 20.18.1 based on the infected host's operating system and its architecture. It then downloads "install_guard.js," which deploys an infostealer tasked with collecting system metadata, browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and sensitive files present on the machine.
The entire operation is powered by a multi-layered architecture comprising fake recruitment (like Amber Group), conference invitation, and package delivery sites; C2 servers that host the JavaScript and are fetched by means of a GitLab dead-drop; and the back office hosted on "170.205.30[.]27:8000" that enables campaign management and victim tracking via a platform called "rms-platform."
The tracking console records every action undertaken by the user, while simultaneously keeping tabs on bot visitors and lookalike domains that have been taken down. Each "real visitor" is then rated "important," "moderate," or "useless," suggesting some sort of shortlisting based on their value.
Further analysis of the API routes associated with "rms-platform" show that it's capable of identifying potential targets by scraping GitHub profiles, sending phishing emails, managing decoys, issuing access codes, viewing and exporting collected data, and cryptocurrency wallet monitoring.
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| Trigram infrastructure architecture |
"These three levels rely on abused legitimate services: GitHub and GitLab for code and configuration hosting; Brevo, Resend, Mailgun, and Smartlead for email delivery; and FullStory for visitor session recording," Stormshield explained.
"The tracking consoles are not standalone applications: they are delivered within the same JavaScript code as the decoys. The same bundle is served to all visitors, and a check on the hostname or URL path determines which interface is displayed."
The technical indicators that point in the direction of UNK_DeadDrop and Kimsuky are listed below -
- eros1030109@gmail[.]com, a super-administrator account for the consoles that matches with an email address used in Operation GitPower.
- 0xapp123, a Medium account that discusses Web3 trends and lists "eros1030109@gmail.com" as the contact email address as far back as June 2022.
- silviattech1129_db_user, an identifier that appears as a username for a MongoDB database associated with "rms-platform" and in the history of the GitLab dead-drop file used in the "antd-img-crop" repository hijack as "silviattech1129."
- alexlopez-g/rms-platform, a backup GitHub repository hosting "rms-platform," with the user having contributed to a separate project named "Foxtopia-NFT/foxtopia-frontend" that includes a ".vscode/tasks.json" file mirroring tactics outlined in UNK_DeadDrop. The commit is signed with an email address "harper.danie95@gmail[.]com," which has been used to target designers on Contra with fake job offers.
- asteara[.]org, a domain flagged as "related infrastructure" for UNK_DeadDrop that has been used to host or serve the Trigram back office.
- pichi_finance_hr, a Telegram account that impersonates the human resources department of Pichi Finance, a decentralized finance (DeFi) platform that went offline in January 2025, and is likely used as a way to approach targets by posing as recruiters.
"Based on these infrastructure and tooling overlaps, we assess with high confidence that Trigram represents a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster, while illustrating an evolution in its delivery tactics," Stormshield concluded.
"Trigram stands out through the diversification of its initial access vectors and the remote retrieval of its final payload, rather than embedding it directly within the trojanized repository."
"This system automates the targeting of users on GitHub, orchestrates massive phishing campaigns through four email providers, monitors the compromise of each victim in real time, and launders the stolen funds through cryptocurrency wallets."








