XCSSET | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

The operators of the XCSSET macOS malware have upped the stakes by making iterative improvements that add support for macOS Monterey by upgrading its source code components to Python 3. "The malware authors have changed from hiding the primary executable in a fake Xcode.app in the initial versions in 2020 to a fake Mail.app in 2021 and now to a fake Notes.app in 2022," SentinelOne researchers Phil Stokes and Dinesh Devadoss  said  in a report. XCSSET, first  documented  by Trend Micro in 2020, has many moving parts that allow it to  harvest sensitive information  from Apple Notes, WeChat, Skype, and Telegram; inject malicious JavaScript code into various websites; and dump cookies from Safari web browser. Infection chains entail using a dropper to compromise users' Xcode projects with the backdoor, with the latter also taking steps to evade detection by masquerading as either system software or the Google Chrome web browser application. The primary executable is an

A malware known for targeting macOS operating system has been updated once again to add more features to its toolset that allows it to amass and exfiltrate sensitive data stored in a variety of apps, including apps such as Google Chrome and Telegram, as part of further "refinements in its tactics." XCSSET was  uncovered  in August 2020, when it was found targeting Mac developers using an unusual means of distribution that involved injecting a malicious payload into Xcode IDE projects that's executed at the time of building project files in Xcode. The malware comes with numerous capabilities, such as reading and dumping Safari cookies, injecting malicious JavaScript code into various websites, stealing information from applications, such as Notes, WeChat, Skype, Telegram, and encrypting user files. Earlier this April, XCSSET  received an upgrade  that enabled the malware authors to target macOS 11 Big Sur as well as Macs running on M1 chipsets by circumventing new sec

Shadow apps, a segment of Shadow IT, are SaaS applications purchased without the knowledge of the security team. While these applications may be legitimate, they operate within the blind spots of the corporate security team and expose the company to attackers.  Shadow apps may include instances of software that the company is already using. For example, a dev team may onboard their own instance of GitHub to keep their work separate from other developers. They might justify the purchase by noting that GitHub is an approved application, as it is already in use by other teams. However, since the new instance is used outside of the security team's view, it lacks governance. It may store sensitive corporate data and not have essential protections like MFA enabled, SSO enforced, or it could suffer from weak access controls. These misconfigurations can easily lead to risks like stolen source code and other issues. Types of Shadow Apps  Shadow apps can be categorized based on their interac