Sliver C2 Framework | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

An open source command-and-control (C2) framework known as Havoc is being adopted by threat actors as an alternative to other well-known legitimate toolkits like  Cobalt Strike ,  Sliver , and  Brute Ratel . Cybersecurity firm Zscaler said it observed a new campaign in the beginning of January 2023 targeting an unnamed government organization that utilized  Havoc . "While C2 frameworks are prolific, the open-source Havoc framework is an advanced post-exploitation command-and-control framework capable of bypassing the most current and updated version of Windows 11 defender due to the implementation of advanced evasion techniques such as indirect syscalls and sleep obfuscation," researchers Niraj Shivtarkar and Shatak Jain  said . The attack sequence documented by Zscaler begins with a ZIP archive that embeds a decoy document and a screen-saver file that's designed to download and launch the Havoc Demon agent on the infected host. Demon is the implant generated via th

Threat actors are leveraging known flaws in Sunlogin software to deploy the Sliver command-and-control (C2) framework for carrying out post-exploitation activities. The findings come from AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC), which discovered that security vulnerabilities in Sunlogin, a remote desktop program developed in China, are being abused to deploy a wide range of payloads. "Not only did threat actors use the Sliver backdoor, but they also used the  BYOVD  (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) malware to incapacitate security products and install reverse shells," the researchers  said . Attack chains commence with the exploitation of two remote code execution bugs in Sunlogin versions prior to v11.0.0.33 (CNVD-2022-03672 and CNVD-2022-10270), followed by delivering Sliver or other malware such as  Gh0st RAT  and XMRig crypto coin miner. In one instance, the threat actor is said to have weaponized the Sunlogin flaws to install a PowerShell script that, in

Compromising the browser is a high-return target for adversaries. Browser extensions, which are small software modules that are added to the browser and can enhance browsing experiences, have become a popular browser attack vector. This is because they are widely adopted among users and can easily turn malicious through developer actions or attacks on legitimate extensions. Recent incidents like  DataSpii  and the  Nigelthorn  malware attack have exposed the extent of damage that malicious extensions can inflict. In both cases, users innocently installed extensions that compromised their privacy and security. The underlying issue lies in the permissions granted to extensions. These permissions, often excessive and lacking granularity, allow attackers to exploit them. What can organizations do to protect themselves from the risks of browser extensions without barring them from use altogether (an act that would be nearly impossible to enforce)?  A new report by LayerX, "Unveiling the