DevSecOps | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

GitHub has officially announced the release of npm version 12 with install scripts disabled by default, along with deprecating granular access tokens (GATs) designed to bypass two-factor authentication (2FA). The Microsoft-owned subsidiary noted that the following npm install behaviors that used to run automatically before have been made opt-in - allowScripts defaults to off, meaning dependency lifecycle scripts (i.e., preinstall, install, postinstall) and implicit node-gyp builds no longer run unless explicitly allowed. --allow-git defaults to none, meaning --allow-git defaults to none: Git dependencies (direct or transitive) are no longer resolved unless explicitly allowed. --allow-remote defaults to none, meaning dependencies from remote URLs (e.g., https tarballs) are no longer resolved unless explicitly allowed. To review and approve trusted scripts, users are now required to run: "npm approve-scripts --allow-scripts-pending," then commit the resulting a...

New research shows that a signed Git commit's hash is not the one-of-a-kind name that much of the software world assumes it to be. Given any signed commit, someone without the signing key can mint a second commit with the same files, author, and date, and a valid signature, GitHub still stamps "Verified." Everything a reviewer would check matches. The commit's hash does not. That matters because so many systems treat a verified commit hash as a permanent, unique name for its contents. Here is the concrete failure: block a bad commit by its hash, and an attacker can re-push the same content under a fresh, still-"Verified" hash your blocklist has never seen. Deduplication, provenance logs, and reproducible-build records that key on the hash inherit the same soft spot. A compromised or hostile mirror can hand cloners validly signed commits whose hashes differ from those on the canonical forge. What this is not is a way to slip different code past a sig...

A critical flaw in Google's Dialogflow CX could have let an attacker with edit rights on one Code Block-enabled agent compromise other Code Block-enabled agents in the same Google Cloud project. From there, they could read live conversations, steal the data users shared, and make the bots send attacker-written messages, including requests to re-enter a password. Security firm Varonis found it and named it Rogue Agent. The flaw affected only organizations that built agents with Dialogflow's Playbooks and custom Code Blocks, which let developers add their own Python. And it was not a remote, unauthenticated attack. Pulling it off needed the dialogflow.playbooks.update permission on one such agent, which limits the realistic attacker to a malicious insider or a compromised developer account, not a stranger on the internet. From that one foothold, though, the reach extended to every agent in the project. Google has fixed it, and both Varonis and Google say there is no sig...

A public issue can trick GitHub Agentic Workflows into leaking the contents of an organization's private repositories, researchers at Noma Security have shown. The attacker needs only to open a normal-looking issue on a public repository, with no stolen credentials and no access to the organization. If that organization has given the agent read access across its repositories, private ones included, the issue can steer it into pulling private contents into a public comment. Noma calls the technique GitLost . The target is GitHub Agentic Workflows , a feature now in public preview that GitHub launched in February. Instead of writing automation scripts, you write instructions to an AI agent in plain English in a Markdown file. The agent reads issues and pull requests, runs tools, and replies on its own. It can be powered by GitHub Copilot, Anthropic's Claude, Google Gemini, or OpenAI Codex. Workflows are read-only by default, but an organization can hand one a token with...

Software supply chain security was hard enough. Then AI joined the build pipeline. For five years, "software supply chain security" meant one question: what's in your code? Which open-source packages, which versions, which transitive dependencies three layers deep that nobody chose on purpose? SolarWinds, Log4Shell, and XZ Utils all taught the same lesson: the risk lives less in the code a team writes and more in everything that produces it. Shai-Hulud, the self-propagating malicious package campaign that spread through developer toolchains this year, taught the next one: knowing what's in your code is still necessary, but it's no longer sufficient. In the roughly 20 months since the Model Context Protocol launched, AI tools, models, and the infrastructure around them have become load-bearing parts of how software gets built, deployed, and run. Code is written by agents. Packages are pulled in by autonomous tools that decide they are needed. Prompts have...

GitHub has rolled out new controls for npm to improve the security of the software supply chain, giving maintainers the ability to explicitly approve a release prior to the packages becoming publicly available for installation. Called staged publishing, the feature is now generally available on npm. It mandates that a human maintainer pass a two-factor authentication (2FA) challenge to approve a package before it is pushed to the npmjs[.]com. "Instead of a direct publish that immediately makes a package version available to consumers, the prebuilt tarball is uploaded to a stage queue where a maintainer must explicitly approve it before it becomes installable," GitHub said . The Microsoft-owned subsidiary said the change ensures "proof of presence" for every publish, including those that come from non-interactive CI/CD workflows and trusted publishing with OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication. Before using staged publishing , package maintainers have to meet...

A new "coordinated" supply chain attack campaign has impacted eight packages on Packagist including malicious code designed to run a Linux binary retrieved from a GitHub Releases URL. "Although the affected packages were all Composer packages, the malicious code was not added to composer.json," Socket said . "Instead, it was inserted into package.json, targeting projects that ship JavaScript build tooling alongside PHP code." This "cross-ecosystem placement" makes the activity stand out because developers and security teams scanning PHP dependencies may only focus on Composer-related metadata, while skipping package.json lifecycle hooks that are bundled within the package. The malicious versions have since been removed from Packagist. An analysis of the packages has uncovered that their upstream repositories have been modified to include a postinstall script that attempts to download a Linux binary from a GitHub Releases URL ("github[...

TL;DR: Stop chasing thousands of "toast" alerts. Join experts from Wiz to learn how hackers connect tiny flaws to build a "Lethal Chain" to your data—and how to break it. Register for the Strategic Briefing Here . Most security tools work like a smoke alarm that goes off every time you burn a piece of toast. You get so many alerts that you eventually start to ignore them. The real danger? While your team is busy fixing 100 "toast" alerts, a sophisticated attacker is quietly building a Lethal Chain through your system. Hackers rarely look for one big "open door" anymore. Instead, they find a series of tiny, low-risk "cracks" that don't look scary on their own. By connecting these cracks—moving from a small coding bug to a cloud misconfiguration—they create a direct path to your most sensitive data. If your tools only look at code or cloud in isolation, you aren’t seeing the big picture. You’re flying blind. The Briefing: Sto...

Checkmarx has confirmed that a modified version of the Jenkins AST plugin was published to the Jenkins Marketplace. "If you are using Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin, you need to ensure that you are using the version 2.0.13-829.vc72453fa_1c16 that was published on December 17, 2025 or previously," the cybersecurity company said in a statement over the weekend. As of writing, Checkmarx has released 2.0.13-848.v76e89de8a_053 on both GitHub and the Jenkins Marketplace. A spokesperson for the company said the new version addresses the concerns associated with the incident. It's assessed that the malicious code was published after obtaining credentials from a previous supply chain attack that took place in March 2026. The development is the latest attack orchestrated by TeamPCP targeting Checkmarx. It arrives a couple of weeks after the notorious cybercrime group was attributed to the compromise of its KICS Docker image, two VS Code extensions, and a GitHub Actions workflo...

Two high-severity security vulnerabilities have been disclosed in Composer, a package manager for PHP, that, if successfully exploited, could result in arbitrary command execution. The vulnerabilities have been described as command injection flaws affecting the Perforce VCS (version control software) driver. Details of the two flaws are below - CVE-2026-40176 (CVSS score: 7.8) - An improper input validation vulnerability that could allow an attacker controlling a repository configuration in a malicious composer.json declaring a Perforce VCS repository to inject arbitrary commands, resulting in command execution in the context of the user running Composer. CVE-2026-40261 (CVSS score: 8.8) - An improper input validation vulnerability stemming from inadequate escaping that could allow an attacker to inject arbitrary commands through a crafted source reference containing shell metacharacters. In both cases, Composer would execute these injected ...

OX Security recently analyzed 216 million security findings across 250 organizations over a 90-day period. The primary takeaway: while raw alert volume grew by 52% year-over-year, prioritized critical risk grew by nearly 400%. The surge in AI-assisted development is creating a "velocity gap" where the density of high-impact vulnerabilities is scaling faster than remediation workflows. The ratio of critical findings to raw alerts nearly tripled, moving from 0.035% to 0.092%. Key Findings from the 2026 Analysis: CVSS vs. Business Context: Technical severity scores are no longer the primary driver of risk. The most common elevation factors were High Business Priority (27.76%) and PII Processing (22.08%) . In modern environments, where a vulnerability lives is now more important than what the vulnerability is. The AI Fingerprint: We observed a direct correlation between the adoption of AI coding tools and the quadrupling of critical f...

OpenAI revealed a GitHub Actions workflow used to sign its macOS apps led to the download of the malicious Axios library on March 31, but noted that no user data or internal system was compromised. "Out of an abundance of caution, we are taking steps to protect the process that certifies our macOS applications are legitimate OpenAI apps," OpenAI said in a post last week. "We found no evidence that OpenAI user data was accessed, that our systems or intellectual property were compromised, or that our software was altered." The disclosure comes a little over a week after Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) attributed the supply chain compromise of the popular npm package to a North Korean hacking group it tracks as UNC1069 . The attack enabled the threat actors to hijack the package maintainer's npm account to push two poisoned versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 that came embedded with a malicious dependency named "plain-crypto-js," which depl...

A high-severity security vulnerability has been disclosed in Docker Engine that could permit an attacker to bypass authorization plugins ( AuthZ ) under specific circumstances. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-34040 (CVSS score: 8.8), stems from an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110 , a maximum-severity vulnerability in the same component that came to light in July 2024. "Using a specially-crafted API request, an attacker could make the Docker daemon forward the request to an authorization plugin without the body," Docker Engine maintainers said in an advisory released late last month. "The authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it." "Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted." Multiple security vulnerabilities, including Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada, Cody, Oleh Konko, and Vladimir...

The most active piece of enterprise infrastructure in the company is the developer workstation. That laptop is where credentials are created, tested, cached, copied, and reused across services, bots, build tools, and now local AI agents. In March 2026, the TeamPCP threat actor proved just how valuable developer machines are. Their supply chain attack on LiteLLM, a popular AI development library downloaded millions of times daily, turned developer endpoints into systematic credential harvesting operations. The malware only needed access to the plaintext secrets already sitting on disk. The LiteLLM Attack: A Case Study in Developer Endpoint Compromise The attack was straightforward in execution but devastating in scope. TeamPCP compromised LiteLLM packages versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI, injecting infostealer malware that activated when developers installed or updated the package. The malware systematically harv...

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered 36 malicious packages in the npm registry that are disguised as Strapi CMS plugins but come with different payloads to facilitate Redis and PostgreSQL exploitation, deploy reverse shells, harvest credentials, and drop a persistent implant. "Every package contains three files (package.json, index.js, postinstall.js), has no description, repository, or homepage, and uses version 3.6.8 to appear as a mature Strapi v3 community plugin," SafeDep said . All identified npm packages follow the same naming convention, starting with "strapi-plugin-" and then phrases like "cron," "database," or "server" to fool unsuspecting developers into downloading them. It's worth noting that the official Strapi plugins are scoped under "@strapi/." The packages, uploaded by four sock puppet accounts "umarbek1233," "kekylf12," "tikeqemif26," and "umar_bektembiev1...

In December 2025 , we shared the first-ever The State of Trusted Open Source report, featuring insights from our product data and customer base on open source consumption across our catalog of container image projects, versions, images, language libraries, and builds. These insights shed light on what teams pull, deploy, and maintain day to day, alongside the vulnerabilities and remediation realities these projects face. Fast forward a few months, and software development is accelerating at a pace that most didn’t see coming. AI is increasingly embedded across the development lifecycle, from code generation to infrastructure automation, as models become more advanced and better at meeting the demands of modern work. This shift is expanding what teams can build and how quickly they can ship. It is also reshaping the security landscape. Before diving into the numbers, it’s important to explain how we perform this analysis. We examined over 2,20...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a now-patched bug impacting Open VSX's pre-publish scanning pipeline to cause the tool to allow a malicious Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension to pass the vetting process and go live in the registry. "The pipeline had a single boolean return value that meant both 'no scanners are configured' and 'all scanners failed to run,'" Koi Security researcher Oran Simhony said in a report shared with The Hacker News. "The caller couldn't tell the difference. So when scanners failed under load, Open VSX treated it as 'nothing to scan for' and waved the extension right through." Early last month, the Eclipse Foundation, which maintains Open VSX, announced plans to enforce pre-publish security checks before VS Code extensions are published to the repository in an attempt to tackle the growing problem of malicious extensions. With Open VSX also serving as the extension market...

Two more GitHub Actions workflows have become the latest to be compromised by credential-stealing malware by a threat actor known as TeamPCP, the cloud-native cybercriminal operation also behind the Trivy supply chain attack . The workflows, both maintained by the supply chain security company Checkmarx, are listed below - checkmarx/ast-github-action checkmarx/kics-github-action Cloud security company Sysdig said it observed an identical credential stealer as the one used in TeamPCP's operations targeting Aqua Security's Trivy vulnerability scanner and its associated GitHub Actions, about four days after the breach on March 19, 2026. The Trivy supply chain compromise is being tracked under the CVE identifier CVE-2026-33634 (CVSS score: 9.4). "This suggests that the stolen credentials from the Trivy compromise were used to poison additional actions in affected repositories," Sysdig said . The stealer, referred to as "TeamPCP Cloud stealer," is desig...

Trivy, a popular open-source vulnerability scanner maintained by Aqua Security, was compromised a second time within the span of a month to deliver malware capable of stealing sensitive CI/CD secrets. The latest incident impacted GitHub Actions " aquasecurity/trivy-action " and " aquasecurity/setup-trivy ," which are used to scan Docker container images for vulnerabilities and set up GitHub Actions workflow with a specific version of the scanner, respectively. "We identified that an attacker force-pushed 75 out of 76 version tags in the aquasecurity/trivy-action repository, the official GitHub Action for running Trivy vulnerability scans in CI/CD pipelines," Socket security researcher Philipp Burckhardt said . "These tags were modified to serve a malicious payload, effectively turning trusted version references into a distribution mechanism for an infostealer." The payload executes within GitHub Actions runners and aims to extract valuable de...

Security teams have spent years building identity and access controls for human users and service accounts. But a new category of actor has quietly entered most enterprise environments, and it operates entirely outside those controls. Claude Code, Anthropic's AI coding agent, is now running across engineering organizations at scale. It reads files, executes shell commands, calls external APIs, and connects to third-party integrations called MCP servers. It does all of this autonomously, with the full permissions of the developer who launched it, on the developer's local machine, before any network-layer security tool can see it. It leaves no audit trail that the existing security infrastructure was built to capture. This walkthrough covers Ceros, an AI Trust Layer built by Beyond Identity that sits directly on the developer's machine alongside Claude Code and provides real-time visibility, runtime policy enforcement, and a cryptographic audit trail of every action the a...