Incident response | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

When patching isn’t fast enough, NDR helps contain the next era of threats. If you’ve been tracking advancements in AI, you know the exploit window, the short buffer that organizations relied on to patch and protect after a vulnerability disclosure, is closing fast. Anthropic’s new model, Claude Mythos , and its Project Glasswing , showed that finding exploitable vulnerabilities and subtle cracks in your defenses in operating systems and browsers — work that once took experts weeks — can now be done in minutes with AI. As a result, the patch window of opportunity is now near-zero . The situation is so critical that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell recently convened an urgent meeting with the CEOs of major U.S. financial institutions to discuss the implied risks. The takeaway was straightforward: surging AI capabilities have upended risk profiles, with profound implications for institutional stability and integrity across industries.  ...

Checkmarx has disclosed that its ongoing investigation tied to the supply chain security incident has revealed that a cybercriminal group published data related to the company on the dark web. "Based on current evidence, we believe this data originated from Checkmarx's GitHub repository, and that access to that repository was facilitated through the initial supply chain attack of March 23, 2026," the Israeli security company said . It also emphasized that the GitHub repository is maintained separately from its customer production environment, adding that no customer data is stored in the repository. Checkmarx said its forensic probe into the incident is ongoing and that it's actively working to verify the nature and scope of the posted data. Furthermore, the company said it has locked down access to the affected GitHub repository as part of its incident response efforts. "If we determine that customer information was involved in this incident, we will notify...

Vercel on Wednesday revealed that it has identified an additional set of customer accounts that were compromised as part of a security incident that enabled unauthorized access to its internal systems. The company said it made the discovery after expanding its investigation to include an extra set of compromise indicators, alongside a review of requests to the Vercel network and environment variable read events in its logs. "Second, we have uncovered a small number of customer accounts with evidence of prior compromise that is independent of and predates this incident, potentially as a result of social engineering, malware, or other methods," the company said in an update. In both cases, Vercel said it notified affected parties. It did not disclose the exact number of customers who were impacted. The development comes after the company that created the Next.js framework acknowledged the breach originated with a compromise of Context.ai after it was used by a Vercel em...

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a previously undocumented data wiper that has been used in attacks targeting Venezuela at the end of last year and the start of 2026. Dubbed Lotus Wiper , the novel file wiper has been used in a destructive campaign targeting the energy and utilities sector in Venezuela, per findings from Kaspersky. "Two batch scripts are responsible for initiating the destructive phase of the attack and preparing the environment for executing the final wiper payload," the Russian cybersecurity vendor said . "These scripts coordinate the start of the operation across the network, weaken system defenses, and disrupt normal operations before retrieving, deobfuscating, and executing a previously unknown wiper." Once deployed, the wiper erases recovery mechanisms, overwrites the content of physical drives, and systematically deletes files across affected volumes, effectively leaving the system in an inoperable state. No extortion or paymen...

A third individual who was employed as a ransomware negotiator has pleaded guilty to conducting ransomware attacks against U.S. companies in 2023. Angelo Martino , 41, of Land O'Lakes, Florida, teamed up with the operators of the BlackCat ransomware starting in April 2023 to assist the e-crime gang in extracting higher amounts as ransoms. "Working as a negotiator on behalf of five different ransomware victims, Martino provided BlackCat attackers with confidential information about the negotiating position and strategy of his company's clients without the clients' or his employer’s knowledge or permission," the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) said in a Monday announcement. The information, which included the victims' insurance policy limits and internal negotiation positions, maximized the ransoms they were required to pay. Martino was financially compensated in exchange for providing the details. Martino, who was charged last month, also admitted to co...

Security teams often present MTTR as an internal KPI. Leadership sees it differently: every hour a threat dwells inside the environment is an hour of potential data exfiltration, service disruption, regulatory exposure, and brand damage.  The root cause of slow MTTR is almost never "not enough analysts." It is almost always the same structural problem: threat intelligence that exists outside the workflow. Feeds that require manual lookup. Reports that live in a shared drive. Enrichment that happens in a separate tab. Every handoff costs minutes; over the course of a workday, those minutes become hours. Mature SOCs have collapsed those handoffs. Their intelligence is embedded in the workflow itself at the exact moment a decision needs to be made. Below are the five places where separation matters most. 1. Detection: Catching Threats Before They Become Incidents In many SOCs, detection begins only when an alert fires. By that point, the attacker may already have a foothol...

The cybersecurity industry has spent the last several years chasing sophisticated threats like zero-days, supply chain compromises, and AI-generated exploits. However, the most reliable entry point for attackers still hasn't changed: stolen credentials. Identity-based attacks remain a dominant initial access vector in breaches today. Attackers obtain valid credentials through credential stuffing from prior breach databases, password spraying against exposed services, or phishing campaigns — and use them to walk through the front door. No exploits needed. Just a valid username and password. What makes this difficult to defend against is how unremarkable the initial access looks. A successful login from a legitimate credential doesn't trigger the same alarms as a port scan or a malware callback. The attacker looks like an employee. Once inside, they dump and crack additional passwords, reuse those credentials to move laterally, and expand their foothold across the environment....

The Computer Emergencies Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has disclosed details of a new campaign that has targeted governments and municipal healthcare institutions, mainly clinics and emergency hospitals, to deliver malware capable of stealing sensitive data from Chromium-based web browsers and WhatsApp. The activity, which was observed between March and April 2026, has been attributed to a threat cluster dubbed UAC-0247 . The origins of the campaign are presently unknown. According to CERT-UA, the starting point of the attack chain is an email message claiming to be a humanitarian aid proposal, urging recipients to click on a link that redirects to either a legitimate website compromised via a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability or a bogus site created with help from artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Regardless of what the site is, the goal is to download and run a Windows Shortcut (LNK) file, which then execut...

Anthropic restricted its Mythos Preview model last week after it autonomously found and exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in every major operating system and browser. Palo Alto Networks' Wendi Whitmore warned that similar capabilities are weeks or months from proliferation. CrowdStrike's 2026 Global Threat Report puts average eCrime breakout time at 29 minutes. Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 shows adversary hand-off times have collapsed to 22 seconds.  Offense is getting faster. The question is where exactly defenders are slow — because it's not where most SOC dashboards suggest. Detection tooling has gotten materially better. EDR, cloud security, email security, identity, and SIEM platforms ship with built-in detection logic that pushes MTTD close to zero for known techniques. That's real progress, and it's the result of years of investment in detection engineering across the industry.  But when adversaries are operating on timelines measured in s...

Unknown threat actors compromised CPUID ("cpuid[.]com"), a website that hosts popular hardware monitoring tools like CPU-Z, HWMonitor, HWMonitor Pro, and PerfMonitor, for less than 24 hours to serve malicious executables for the software and deploy a remote access trojan called STX RAT. The incident lasted from approximately April 9, 15:00 UTC, to about April 10, 10:00 UTC, with the download URLs for CPU-Z and HWMonitor installers replaced with links to malicious websites. In a post shared on X, CPUID confirmed the breach, attributing it to a compromise of a "secondary feature (basically a side API)" that caused the main site to randomly display malicious links. It's worth noting that the attack did not impact its signed original files. According to Kaspersky , the names of the rogue websites are as follows - cahayailmukreatif.web[.]id pub-45c2577dbd174292a02137c18e7b1b5a.r2[.]dev transitopalermo[.]com vatrobran[.]hr "The t...

Your attack surface no longer lives on one operating system, and neither do the campaigns targeting it. In enterprise environments, attackers move across Windows endpoints, executive MacBooks, Linux infrastructure, and mobile devices, taking advantage of the fact that many SOC workflows are still fragmented by platform.  For security leaders, this creates a costly operational gap : slower validation, limited early-stage visibility, more escalations, and more time for attackers to steal credentials, establish persistence, or move deeper before the response fully begins. The Multi-OS Attack Problem SOCs Aren’t Ready For A multi-OS attack can turn one threat into several different investigations at once. The campaign may follow a different path depending on the system it reaches, which breaks the speed and consistency SOC teams rely on during early triage. Instead of moving through one clear validation pro...

Threat actors associated with Qilin  and Warlock ransomware operations have been observed using the bring your own vulnerable driver ( BYOVD ) technique to silence security tools running on compromised hosts, according to findings from Cisco Talos and Trend Micro. Qilin attacks analyzed by Talos have been found to deploy a malicious DLL named "msimg32.dll," which initiates a multi-stage infection chain to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. The DLL, launched via DLL side-loading, is capable of terminating more than 300 EDR drivers from almost every security vendor in the market. "The first stage consists of a PE loader responsible for preparing the execution environment for the EDR killer component," Talos researchers Takahiro Takeda and Holger Unterbrink said . "This secondary payload is embedded within the loader in an encrypted form." The DLL loader implements an array of techniques to evade de...

What is really slowing Tier 1 down: the threat itself or the process around it? In many SOCs, the biggest delays do not come from the threat alone. They come from fragmented workflows, manual triage steps, and limited visibility early in the investigation. Fixing those process gaps can help Tier 1 move faster, reduce unnecessary escalations, and improve how the entire SOC responds under pressure.  Here are three process fixes that can help unlock stronger Tier 1 performance. Process #1: Replace Tool Switching with One Cross-Platform Investigation Workflow The problem: Tier 1 often loses time moving between different tools, interfaces, and processes to investigate suspicious activity across operating systems. What starts as one alert can quickly turn into a fragmented workflow. Why it hurts productivity: Constant tool switching slows down triage, breaks investigation focus, and makes it harder to build a clear picture of what is happening. It also increases the chance of missed...

Most teams have security tools in place. Alerts are firing, dashboards look clean, threat intel is flowing in. On the surface, everything feels under control. But one question usually stays unanswered: Would your defenses actually stop a real attack? That’s where things get shaky. A control exists, so it’s assumed to work. A detection rule is active, so it’s expected to catch something. But very few teams are consistently testing how all of this holds up when someone is actively trying to break through, step by step. This is exactly the gap this webinar focuses on. Exposure-Driven Resilience: Automate Testing to Validate & Improve Your Security Posture is a practical session built around one idea: stop guessing, start proving. Instead of relying on occasional testing or assumptions, it shows how to validate your security posture continuously using real attacker behavior. The session walks through how to pressure-test both your controls and your processes, how to use threa...

Cybersecurity has changed fast. Roles are more specialized, and tooling is more advanced. On paper, this should make organizations more secure. But in practice, many teams struggle with the same basic problems they faced years ago: unclear risk priorities, misaligned tooling decisions, and difficulty explaining security issues in terms the business understands. These challenges do not usually come from a lack of effort. They emerge from something more subtle, a gradual loss of foundational understanding as specialization accelerates. Specialization itself is not the problem. A lack of context is. When security teams do not have a shared understanding of how the business, systems, and risks fit together, even strong technical execution starts to break down. Over time, that gap shows up in the way programs are designed, tools are chosen, and incidents are handled. Unfortunately, I’ve seen this pattern repeatedly when assisting with ...

The most dangerous phishing campaigns aren’t just designed to fool employees. Many are designed to exhaust the analysts investigating them. When a phishing investigation takes 12 hours instead of five minutes, the outcome can shift from a contained incident to a breach. For years, the cybersecurity industry has focused on the front door of phishing defense: employee training, email gateways that filter known threats, and reporting programs that encourage users to flag suspicious messages. Far less attention has been paid to what happens after a report is filed, and how attackers exploit the investigation process that follows.  Alert fatigue in Security Operations Centers isn't just an operational inconvenience . It can become an attack surface. SOC teams increasingly report phishing campaigns that appear designed not only to compromise targets but also to overwhelm the analysts responsible for investigating them.  This shifts how organizations should think about phishing d...

Every CISO knows the uncomfortable truth about their Security Operations Center: the people most responsible for catching threats in real time are the people with the least experience. Tier 1 analysts sit at the front line of detection, and yet they are also the most vulnerable to the cognitive and organizational pressures that quietly erode SOC performance over time. The Paradox at the Gate: Why Tier 1 Carries the Weight but Lacks the Armor Tier 1 is the layer that processes the highest volume of alerts, performs initial triage, and determines what gets escalated. But it is built on a foundation that is structurally fragile. Entry-level analysts, high turnover rates, and relentless alert queues create conditions where even well-designed detection rules fail to translate into timely, accurate responses. The paradox is here:  Tier 1 performance defines SOC performance; But Tier 1 is often the least supported, least empowered, and most cognitively overloaded layer Tier 1 an...

Triage is supposed to make things simpler. In a lot of teams, it does the opposite. When you can’t reach a confident verdict early, alerts turn into repeat checks, back-and-forth, and “just escalate it” calls. That cost doesn’t stay inside the SOC; it shows up as missed SLAs, higher cost per case, and more room for real threats to slip through. So where does triage go wrong? Here are five triage issues that turn investigations into expensive guesswork, and how top teams are changing the outcome with execution evidence. 1. Decisions Made Without Real Evidence Business risk: The hardest triage failure to notice is when decisions get made before proof exists. If responders rely on partial signals (labels, hash matches, reputation), they end up approving or escalating cases without seeing what the file or link actually does.  That uncertainty fuels false positives, missed real threats, slower containment, and higher cost per case, while giving attackers more time before anyone h...

Cloud attacks move fast — faster than most incident response teams. In data centers, investigations had time. Teams could collect disk images, review logs, and build timelines over days. In the cloud, infrastructure is short-lived. A compromised instance can disappear in minutes. Identities rotate. Logs expire. Evidence can vanish before analysis even begins. Cloud forensics is fundamentally different from traditional forensics. If investigations still rely on manual log stitching, attackers already have the advantage. Register: See Context-Aware Forensics in Action ➜ Why Traditional Incident Response Fails in the Cloud Most teams face the same problem: alerts without context. You might detect a suspicious API call, a new identity login, or unusual data access — but the full attack path remains unclear across the environment. Attackers use this visibility gap to move laterally, escalate privileges, and reach critical assets before responders can connect the activity. To...

My objective As someone relatively inexperienced with network threat hunting, I wanted to get some hands-on experience using a network detection and response (NDR) system. My goal was to understand how NDR is used in hunting and incident response, and how it fits into the daily workflow of a Security Operations Center (SOC). Corelight’s Investigator software , part of its Open NDR Platform, is designed to be user-friendly (even for junior analysts) so I thought it would be a good fit for me. I was given access to a production version of Investigator that had been loaded with pre-recorded network traffic. This is a common way to learn how to use this type of software. While I’m new to threat hunting, I do have experience looking at network traffic flows. I was even an early user of one of the first network traffic analyzers called Sniffer. Sniffers were specialized PCs equipped with network adapters designed to capture traffic and packets. These computers were the foundation on whi...