Identity Security | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

AI security agents are starting to influence real security decisions. They summarize findings, prioritize remediation, recommend next steps, and help teams move faster. But most still rely on fragmented risk signals: scanner output, severity scores, threat intelligence, configuration findings, and exposure data. That fragmentation matters because attackers do not move through environments one tool category at a time. They chain exposures across identities, networks, cloud assets, applications, and security controls. If the AI workflow only sees isolated findings, it cannot understand whether those findings create a real attack path. As AI-powered attackers accelerate exploitation, security teams need more than faster AI-assisted workflows. They need workflows grounded in evidence that can prove which risks are exploitable. These systems can correlate information and identify patterns, but without validation, they cannot answer the question security teams ultimately care about: C...

At least two distinct threat actors are weaponizing a novel evasion technique called OAuth client ID spoofing in cloud campaigns, while slipping past telemetry. The activity allows users to enumerate user accounts and validate stolen credentials in Microsoft Entra ID environments, without ever generating a successful sign-in event that would otherwise alert defenders. And bad actors have begun to exploit this gap to obtain unauthorized access to an organization's cloud services. "A blind spot in cloud sign-in telemetry: Entra ID returns different error responses depending on whether a supplied OAuth client ID is valid," Proofpoint said in a statement. "Attackers exploit this to infer valid usernames and correct passwords at scale, effectively checking stolen credential lists without logging a successful login." In other words, the attacks leverage the OAuth client ID, a globally unique identifier (GUID) assigned to applications when requesting access to ...

Attackers whose methods line up with the data-extortion group  ShinyHunters  have spent the past year walking into corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a single flaw in the platform. The way in has been the trust the organization had already extended, usually through the OAuth connections that tie Salesforce to the apps and third-party vendors around it. In  research published July 13 , Microsoft mapped the campaigns, which ran from mid-2025 into mid-2026, to three distinct techniques. It also worked with Salesforce to roll out new detection and governance tooling aimed at addressing the activity authentication logs miss. That is what makes this hard to catch. When the access comes from a real user who approved a connected app, or from an integration the company already trusts, the traffic reads as ordinary use, and sign-in and authentication monitoring barely registers it. What matters is what the app or account does once it is in, and that is ex...

Somewhere right now, a security tool is quietly finding bugs faster than any human can fix them. That's supposed to be the good news. The catch is that the attackers have the same tools, pointed the other way, and they don't file tickets. That's the shape of this week. Trusted code turns on the people who installed it. Old bugs from last year are still landing because the fix sat in a queue too long. Fake installers, poisoned packages, systems left facing the open internet, and helpful little AI assistants running instructions that were never yours. The gap between "patch exists" and "already exploited" keeps shrinking, and nobody's closing it. None of it is exotic. That's what wears you down. Same ordinary mistakes, just happening faster than we can keep up. Here's the full mess, top to bottom. ⚡ Threat of the Week Progress Tells ShareFile Customers to Shut Down Storage Zone Controllers — Progress urged customers to shut down Win...

A new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation called Forg365 is using a combination of device code phishing , adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) tactics, antibot evasion, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted lure creation, and post-compromise mailbox operations targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Distributed via Telegram and costing $400 a month (or $3,800 per year), attack chains leverage phishing lures that make use of legitimate email delivery infrastructure, such as Amazon Simple Email Service (Amazon SES) and Twilio SendGrid, to imitate a redirection chain that blends into regular email traffic before it ends in Forg365-controlled domains. "The panel exposes a mature operator workflow: accounts, links, invitations, OAuth app configuration, redirect links, SVG generation, campaign sending, SMTP profiles, SMTP rotation, AI email generation, token vaulting, account intelligence, keyword alerts, viewer links, and browser-extension support," ZeroBEC said . The email securi...

An attacker running a live Microsoft 365 phishing operation left a Python web server listening on a public port with directory listing switched on. The command that did it:  python3 -m http.server 8080 , was still sitting in the readable  .bash_history . From that one lapse, French security firm  Lexfo  lifted the operator's entire toolkit and pivoted through it to two more phishing operators, three campaigns in all. Each ran a custom fork of the open-source Evilginx proxy , cloned from public GitHub. The largest of the three had been running for more than a year, its victims overwhelmingly corporate mailboxes. The three got past MFA in two mechanically different ways, one by proxying the live login , one by abusing a legitimate Microsoft sign-in flow. The two need different defenses, which is the part that matters most if you run Microsoft 365. Directory listing on a working attack server is close to a full confession. The listing exposed phishing conf...

A threat actor has been targeting organizations spanning multiple sectors with voice-based fake security requests that prompt Microsoft 365 users to enroll a new Entra passkey with an aim to carry out data extortion attacks. The threat actor, tracked by Okta under the moniker O-UNC-066 , has deployed a panel-controlled phishing kit that's capable of targeting the passkey enrollment process . The activity has singled out food and beverage, technology, healthcare, automotive, construction, and aviation industries. "The threat actor registers domains that incorporate the word passkey as part of a voice-enabled phishing ('vishing') scheme," Okta researcher Houssem Eddine Bordjiba said . "The threat actor then calls targeted users on the phone in an attempt to persuade them that they need to register a new passkey." Users are then directed to a phishing kit that's identical to the Microsoft passkey enrollment process, giving the impression that th...

New research shows that a signed Git commit's hash is not the one-of-a-kind name that much of the software world assumes it to be. Given any signed commit, someone without the signing key can mint a second commit with the same files, author, and date, and a valid signature, GitHub still stamps "Verified." Everything a reviewer would check matches. The commit's hash does not. That matters because so many systems treat a verified commit hash as a permanent, unique name for its contents. Here is the concrete failure: block a bad commit by its hash, and an attacker can re-push the same content under a fresh, still-"Verified" hash your blocklist has never seen. Deduplication, provenance logs, and reproducible-build records that key on the hash inherit the same soft spot. A compromised or hostile mirror can hand cloners validly signed commits whose hashes differ from those on the canonical forge. What this is not is a way to slip different code past a sig...

For years, account takeover (ATO) followed a predictable script. Attackers bought stolen credentials in bulk, ran them through automated tools, and waited for matches. Credential stuffing was cheap, scalable, and for defenders, relatively well understood. That era is ending. Not because attackers gave up, but because the front door finally got harder to kick in. Passkeys are now mainstream. According to the FIDO Alliance's 2026 research, 75% of global consumers have enabled a passkey on at least one account. At the same time, passkeys are becoming more common in the workplace, with 68% of companies now using, testing, or introducing them for employee sign-ins.  Phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication is no longer aspirational, it's becoming the default. When the password disappears, so does the value of a stolen password. So where does the attack go next? It moves downstream, to the moments where systems still trust a human to prove who they are. The attac...

A Microsoft 365 device code phishing campaign has been observed leveraging collaboration-themed lures to take control of victim accounts between the last week of June 2026 and into early July, per findings from ZeroBEC. "The campaign did not depend on a fake Microsoft password page. It used a malicious collaboration-style lure to push users into the legitimate Microsoft device login experience, while a backend broker generated and polled Microsoft Authentication Broker device-code tokens," the email security company said in a report shared with The Hacker News. The activity is assessed to share "strong" overlaps with a campaign documented by Microsoft in February 2025 under the moniker Storm-2372 , including the use of messaging or Teams-style lures to trick unsuspecting victims into entering an attacker-provided device code, along with their credentials, effectively allowing the threat actor to recover the token and hijack their account. Despite these simi...

A streaming box should not need a threat model. Neither should a username field, a demo repo, a reset flow, or a browser permission prompt. That is the irritating part this week: the risky pieces were ordinary. Home devices became a routing cover. Clean code pulled dirt from a dependency. Identity shortcuts aged badly. AI systems trusted the wrong instructions. Same soft spot throughout: trust placed one layer too early. Below is the full recap, since this is apparently what counted as a normal week. ⚡ Threat of the Week NetNut Residential Proxy Network Disrupted — Google, in collaboration with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Lumen, and other partners, took action against the NetNut residential proxy network, also known as Popa, building upon its takedown of IPIDEA in January 2026. Google said it disabled Google accounts and associated Google services used by NetNut for malware command-and-control (C2) and updated Google Play Protect, in addition to disabling ...

Building a shortlist for an AI SOC evaluation can be tough. SIEM, SOAR, and pureplay AI SOC vendors are all saying the same thing. But behind the identical label sit very different products, from chat assistants bolted onto a legacy SIEM to agent platforms that run detection, triage, investigation, and response on their own data foundation. Whether a platform will materially change outcomes for your team matters more than what it is called. We can measure that in investigation time, false-positive volume, analyst hours returned, total cost of running your SOC and finally whether the architecture will hold up 2-3 years from now as the volume, speed and complexity of attacks keep increasing. What Is an AI SOC Platform? An AI SOC platform is a security operations platform where AI agents carry out the core work of the SOC (detection, triage, investigation, and response) by reasoning over correlated security data, under human oversight. It differs from bolt-on AI, which summarizes ...

This week was a reminder that attackers do not always need big tricks. One small mistake, one old access path, one missed patch, and suddenly the door is open. The noise is not all noise, either. Forums are talking, researchers are finding easy cracks, and defenders have more cleanup waiting. Here’s the full Monday recap. ⚡ Threat of the Week New DirtyClone Linux Kernel Flaw Lets Local Users Gain Root via Cloned Packets — Cybersecurity researchers detailed a new variant of the Dirty Frag Linux kernel flaw. Called DirtyClone (aka CVE-2026-43503), it allows local users to gain root privileges via cloned packets. The exploit works successfully on Debian, Ubuntu, and Fedora systems with default namespace configurations. "Any local user on a server or device running a vulnerable kernel who holds or can acquire the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability (frequently obtainable via unprivileged user namespaces) [is exploitable]," JFrog said. "This poses the highest risk to multi-te...

It’s Monday again. This week’s threat list looks painfully familiar: abused integrations, fake tools, poisoned websites, ransomware crews trying to shut down security tools, and mobile malware asking for way too much control. The annoying part is how little of this feels new. Weak credentials, sketchy downloads, browser extensions with too much access, and WordPress sites are used to push more attacks. Nothing clever. Just sloppy, cheap, and effective. Here’s the Monday recap. Let’s get into the week’s mess. ⚡ Threat of the Week FortiBleed Campaign Identifies Over 80K Targets — A large-scale campaign codenamed FortiBleed has systematically targeted and compromised Fortinet FortiGate firewall and SSL VPN gateway devices worldwide. According to SOCRadar, it has been running since at least February 2026, with over 80,000 devices identified with working usernames and passwords that have been tested by suspected Russian-speaking threat actors using automated tools running around...

The first wave of enterprise AI concern was straightforward. It was simply employees pasting sensitive data into public AI tools. Security teams responded with usage policies, domain blocks, and data loss prevention rules. That response made sense at the time. It doesn't fit the problem anymore. Shadow AI has shifted from a data leakage concern to an access control problem. The threat isn't about what employees type into AI tools. It's about which AI agents are running inside the organization, what enterprise systems they're connected to, and what actions they're authorized,or not, to take. From passive tools to active actors Employees and business units are building AI agents at a pace most security teams can't keep track of. Custom assistants, coding agents, workflow automations, and agentic applications are being created across departments with some in sanctioned platforms, but many through browser extensions, SaaS-native features, developer tools, M...

If an autonomous AI agent interacts with your company's core intellectual property today, can your security team instantly name the person who authorized it? For most enterprises, the answer is a simple no . The rush to adopt internal AI tools has left a massive trail of administrative debt: orphaned agents (AI tools left running after their creator leaves the company) and standing privileges (AI that retains permanent, unrestricted access it no longer needs). When an employee moves on, the automated tools they built stay active—often keeping unmonitored access to sensitive databases and source code long after the human’s credentials are revoked. To help security teams bridge this line of accountability, The Hacker News is hosting a technical briefing. Secure your spot today for the live webinar: Orphaned Agents & Standing Privileges: The Hidden Access Risks of Internal AI . Why Existing Security Tools Miss the Signal Traditional access tools treat AI like stand...

Stuff broke again. Not in a movie way. An old tool was left exposed. An abandoned package was abused. A deprecated feature was still running in prod. This week is the same lesson in a new form: phishing kits are easier to rent, AI names are useful bait, old login paths still fail, and forgotten software keeps becoming someone else's entry point. Scroll through the full Monday Cybersecurity Recap below for the news, tools, webinars, and fixes worth your time this week. ⚡ Threat of the Week Google Patches Actively Exploited Chrome 0-Day - Google released security updates to address 74 vulnerabilities, including one that has come under active exploitation in the wild. The high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-11645 (CVSS score: 8.8), has been described as an out-of-bounds memory access in V8, Chrome's JavaScript and WebAssembly engine. Google acknowledged that an "exploit for CVE-2026-11645 exists in the wild," but stopped short of sharing addition...

Your pentest report looks clean. That might be the problem. Run automated pentesting long enough, and the new findings start to dry up. By the third or fourth run, fewer issues appear. The report looks stable. Leadership reads "stable" as "secure." It usually isn't. The work slows down. The risk does not. That gap is what a The Hacker News webinar with Picus Security sets out to close. Autumn Stambaugh and Can Yüceel, with host James Azar, show what your tool validates, where it stops, and how to close what it leaves open. Register for the webinar. Start with the core problem. A flat report can mean the obvious holes were fixed. It can also mean the tool has reached the edge of what it can see. Automated pentesting is often treated as full security validation. It is not. Picus frames validation as six surfaces and puts automated pentesting on one of them, the attack path: whether an attacker can move through an environment. That leaves the other five ...

Monday again. The weekend was meant to be quiet. It wasn't. Last week had poisoned packages, a broken AI helper, and a worm tearing through repos. The ugly part: basic tricks still worked. A chatbot got fooled. A bot token got leaked inside the malware. The same old mistakes showed up again. And while everyone chased the loud stuff, quieter attackers sat in inboxes for months, reading mail and stealing it bit by bit. Lots to cover. Grab coffee. Read up. ⚡ Threat of the Week Miasma Worm Hits 73 Microsoft GitHub Repositories in Supply Chain Attack - Microsoft's GitHub repositories became the latest to fall victim to the ongoing Miasma self-replicating supply chain attack campaign. The incident impacted 73 Microsoft repositories across four of its GitHub organizations, including Azure, Azure-Samples, Microsoft, and MicrosoftDocs. The development prompted GitHub to disable access to those repositories. Miasma is assessed to be a variant of the Mini Shai-Hulud worm that T...

Password manager Dashlane has disclosed that "fewer than" 20 users on the personal subscription plan had their encrypted vaults downloaded following a brute-force attack launched by an unknown party. On May 31, 2026, the company said an "external" threat actor launched a brute-force attack against certain Dashlane user accounts with the aim of breaking two-factor authentication (2FA) protections and allowing them to register new devices on existing user accounts. Exactly how many users were targeted remains unknown, but Dashlane said the high volume of attempts on those accounts triggered temporary account suspensions and authentication issues due to its built-in security controls. Although access to the accounts has since been restored, the company has now revealed that the attackers were successful in a handful of cases, enabling them to download a copy of the encrypted vaults belonging to less than 20 personal plan users. "We have directly notif...