API Security | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

AI agent security is moving through a familiar maturity curve: adoption, then visibility, and finally, control. But what we've collectively discovered is that enforcing least privilege for AI agents is harder than we ever imagined. This is why there are so many approaches, from prompt filtering to identity-layer access controls. Where we've collectively landed is that understanding the intent of AI agents is essential to securing them. It's not easy, but it's the only path forward. Organizations approach this challenge with different levels of sophistication. For many, the current goal is simply to find the AI agents already operating across the business. That is a necessary first step. AI agents are appearing in SaaS platforms, developer environments, cloud workflows, customer support systems, productivity tools, and internal applications. Some are sanctioned, and others are not. But discovery alone isn't useful. AI agents are not passive; they reason, plan, c...

Updated July 18, 2026: the two flaws now carry CVE IDs, the full mechanism has been published, a persistent-object-cache condition has surfaced, and a working proof-of-concept is public. The story below reflects all of it. An anonymous HTTP request can run code on a WordPress site. The bug is in core, so a bare install with zero plugins is exploitable. Every 6.9 and 7.0 site was in range until Friday, when WordPress shipped 6.9.5 and 7.0.2 and enabled what it calls forced updates through its auto-update system. wp2shell is two bugs, not one, and both now carry CVE IDs. CVE-2026-63030 is the REST API batch-route confusion; CVE-2026-60137 is a SQL injection in WordPress core. Chained, they take an anonymous request all the way to code execution. Since Friday, the full mechanism has been published, and a working proof-of-concept has gone up on GitHub. Adam Kues at Assetnote, Searchlight Cyber's attack surface management arm, found the batch-route bug and reported it throug...

n8n , the workflow automation platform, handed out the wrong accounts at login. On Enterprise instances configured to trust more than one external token issuer, it matched an incoming JWT to a local user on the  sub  claim alone and ignored  iss . A valid token from issuer A carrying a  sub  that belongs to someone under issuer B logged you in as them. Their password never came into it. n8n shipped the fix on June 24. The flaw is tracked as  CVE-2026-59208 . The CVE record did not go public until July 9. n8n  credits the report  to the GitHub account bearsyankees , whose profile lists Strix, which makes an AI penetration testing agent. Strix  says  it pointed out that the agent at the token-exchange flow and found the identity-binding bug there. Two issuers, one account Token exchange is n8n's Enterprise route for  OEM partners who embed the product , an  RFC 8693 implementation  that spares their users a second...

SAP has rolled out updates to address multiple vulnerabilities as part of its July 2026 security updates, including a critical flaw in SAP NetWeaver Application Server ABAP. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-44747 (CVSS score: 9.9), an out-of-bounds write flaw that allows an authenticated attacker to leverage logical errors in memory management to cause a memory corruption that could lead to unauthorized data access, modification, or system unavailability. "As a temporary workaround the note proposes to disable all ICF nodes with a specific property in transaction SICF," SAP security firm Onapsis said . "Since the workaround will disable opening transactions in SAP GUI for HTML, it is not an option for all customers and it is strongly recommended to install the patching ABAP Kernel version." Also addressed by SAP are two other critical vulnerabilities - CVE-2026-27690 (CVSS score: 9.1) - An HTTP request/response smuggling flaw in SAP Approuter...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of two access control-related flaws impacting the RabbitMQ message broker service that could allow attackers to leak OAuth client secrets, expose enterprise messaging infrastructure to takeover risks, and bypass tenant boundaries. Miggo's security team, which discovered and reported the flaws, said one "leaks the broker's confidential OAuth secret to an unauthenticated attacker in a single request, a direct path to full broker takeover in the configurations that use that secret." The second vulnerability allows any logged-in user to silently read other tenants' data. Both shortcomings are said to have been present in the codebase since early 2024, impacting RabbitMQ release lines from 3.13.0 and later. They have been addressed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15. There is no evidence of active exploitation of either of the vulnerabilities prior to the public disclosure. A brief description ...

Datadog Security Labs is warning of "several overlapping campaigns" that are systematically enumerating corporate GitHub organizations, repositories, and user accounts through the GitHub API. "Operators rely on automated scraping tooling with custom or legitimate-sounding user agents, leveraging GitHub 'ghost' accounts that are often years old, or compromised OAuth tokens and personal access tokens (PATs) from legitimate users," Julie Agnes Sparks, senior security engineer at Datadog, said . While the activity in most cases involves targeting public data, select instances have gone beyond public information enumeration to successfully clone private repositories. The campaign employs a mix of automated scanner tools, over 50 dormant accounts, and dozens of legitimate accounts that have had their personal access tokens (PATs) exposed unintentionally or compromised through some other method to facilitate the enumeration. What's notable about the ...

The threat actor known as ToddyCat has been attributed to a new malware called Umbrij that's designed to gain surreptitious access to a victim's email correspondence via the Google API. "In this campaign, the attackers focused their attention on corporate email communications hosted on Gmail, targeting access compromise via APIs," Kaspersky said in a detailed report published this week. "Because the Google API relies on the OAuth 2.0 protocol for authorization, applications can use an OAuth token to access requested email resources." The adversary is said to have developed Umbrij to acquire this token and use it to connect to the browser's management console in headless mode via a remote debugging port. Subsequently, a series of requests was issued to obtain an OAuth authorization code, which was then exchanged for an access token to reach the target resources via the API. The technique has been codenamed Shadow Token via Remote Debug (STRD) b...

A recently disclosed critical security flaw impacting Progress Kemp LoadMaster is seeing active exploitation attempts, according to an advisory from eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU). The Canadian cybersecurity company said it identified exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-8037 (CVSS score: 9.6), an operating system (OS) command injection flaw that could be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution on susceptible devices. The exploitation activity commenced on June 29, 2026. "OS Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in API in Progress LoadMaster allows an unauthenticated attacker with permissions to execute arbitrary commands on the LoadMaster appliance by exploiting unsanitized input," Progress said in an advisory for the vulnerability released early last month. In an analysis published this week, watchTowr Labs described the flaw as rooted in a function named "escape_quotes()" within the load balancer application and tha...

Researchers tested 444 AI chatbot apps for iPhone and found that 282 of them, nearly two-thirds, exposed paid AI access through their network traffic. In many cases, the path in was visible just by watching what the app sent: a plaintext API key, a reusable token, or a backend server that accepted requests with no key at all. Whoever grabs it can send model requests on the developer's account, and the developer pays the bill. Three months after the researchers warned the developers, only 28% had fixed it. The work, from researchers at Wake Forest University, is the  first in-depth study of the problem on iOS . It is striking partly because of how little effort the snooping took. The team used a tool they built, LLMKeyLens , that watches an app's traffic and pulls out the credentials as they go by. No jailbreaking, no cracking the app open. The key is the secret that lets the app call a service like OpenAI or Google Gemini. Embed it in the app, and it is exposed with ev...

A critical vulnerability in Progress Kemp LoadMaster can let an unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary commands as root on the appliance by sending a crafted request to its API. The flaw, tracked as  CVE-2026-8037 , carries a CVSS score of  9.8 according to ZDI . A patch is available. If you run LoadMaster with the API enabled, update now. Progress  published its advisory on June 4  and says it has not received any reports of exploitation. On June 29, researchers at watchTowr Labs published a detailed technical write-up that walks through the full exploit chain. What the Flaw Does LoadMaster is an application delivery controller and load balancer used by enterprises to manage traffic across servers. It sits at the network edge, which makes any pre-auth flaw in it especially dangerous. The vulnerability lives in a function called  escape_quotes() , which is supposed to sanitize user input before it gets passed into a shell command. The f...

Threat actors are exploiting a recently patched security flaw impacting Gravity SMTP, a WordPress plugin that's installed on about 100,000 sites. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-4020 (CVSS score: 5.3), is a medium-severity information disclosure flaw that can allow unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive data, such as configuration data, API keys, secrets, and OAuth tokens configured for the plugin's email integrations. "This is due to a REST API endpoint registered at /wp-json/gravitysmtp/v1/tests/mock-data with a permission_callback that unconditionally returns true, allowing any unauthenticated visitor to access it," Wordfence said . "When the ?page=gravitysmtp-settings query parameter is appended, the plugin's register_connector_data() method populates internal connector data, causing the endpoint to return approximately 365 KB of JSON containing the full System Report." As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can weaponize ...

The first wave of enterprise AI concern was straightforward. It was simply employees pasting sensitive data into public AI tools. Security teams responded with usage policies, domain blocks, and data loss prevention rules. That response made sense at the time. It doesn't fit the problem anymore. Shadow AI has shifted from a data leakage concern to an access control problem. The threat isn't about what employees type into AI tools. It's about which AI agents are running inside the organization, what enterprise systems they're connected to, and what actions they're authorized,or not, to take. From passive tools to active actors Employees and business units are building AI agents at a pace most security teams can't keep track of. Custom assistants, coding agents, workflow automations, and agentic applications are being created across departments with some in sanctioned platforms, but many through browser extensions, SaaS-native features, developer tools, M...

If an autonomous AI agent interacts with your company's core intellectual property today, can your security team instantly name the person who authorized it? For most enterprises, the answer is a simple no . The rush to adopt internal AI tools has left a massive trail of administrative debt: orphaned agents (AI tools left running after their creator leaves the company) and standing privileges (AI that retains permanent, unrestricted access it no longer needs). When an employee moves on, the automated tools they built stay active—often keeping unmonitored access to sensitive databases and source code long after the human’s credentials are revoked. To help security teams bridge this line of accountability, The Hacker News is hosting a technical briefing. Secure your spot today for the live webinar: Orphaned Agents & Standing Privileges: The Hidden Access Risks of Internal AI . Why Existing Security Tools Miss the Signal Traditional access tools treat AI like stand...

Breaches don't always start with a zero-day. An exposed admin panel can get brute-forced, or credentials reused from a previous attack. But when a vulnerability does drop — like MongoBleed earlier this year, which let attackers pull credentials and session tokens from server memory without authentication — anything internet-facing is immediately at risk. With time-to-exploit now down to a single day, the question isn't just how fast you can patch. It's why the service was exposed in the first place. The team at Intruder analyzed 3,000 attack surfaces to find out how much of a typical organization's attack surface consists of services that have no reason to be there. We grouped what we found into four categories — HTTP panels, risky ports and services, databases, and publicly accessible files and information. The full findings, including breakdowns by company size and industry, are in our 2026 Attack Surface Management Index . How widespread is the problem? ...

A default low-privilege account on a LiteLLM proxy can climb to full admin and run code on the server by chaining three vulnerabilities, researchers at Obsidian Security disclosed LiteLLM is a widely deployed open-source AI gateway that brokers calls to more than 100 model providers behind one OpenAI-compatible interface. A server takeover exposes every provider key it holds, the secrets that decrypt its stored credentials, and every prompt and response passing through it. Obsidian rates the full chain CVSS 9.9, in the Critical range. BerriAI , the maintainer, included the complete fix set in LiteLLM v1.83.14-stable, which GitHub lists as released May 2. Upgrade to that release or later to close the three-CVE chain. The three bugs The first link is CVE-2026-47101 , an authorization bypass. When a regular user (an internal_user) generates a virtual API key, LiteLLM stores the caller-supplied allowed_routes field without checking it against the user's role. The field is...

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Monday added a high-severity flaw impacting BerriAI LiteLLM to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities ( KEV ) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-42271 (CVSS score: 8.7), is a command injection vulnerability that could allow any authenticated user to run arbitrary commands on the host. It affects the following version of the LiteLLM Python package - >= 1.74.2 < 1.83.7 "Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it - POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list - accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport," according to a description of the flaw shared by BerriAI. "When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host w...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new malicious supply chain campaign that's targeting developers using OpenAI Codex through a legitimate-looking remote web UI. The tool, named codexui-android , is advertised on GitHub and npm as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex, attracting over 29,000 weekly downloads. The package is still available for download from the repository. What makes this activity noteworthy is that it's not a traditional attack that uses a typosquat or throwaway package to trick developers. Rather, the malicious code is embedded into a functional npm package that has undergone active development. The associated GitHub repository remains clean. "And for the past month, every single invocation has been quietly exfiltrating your Codex authentication tokens to an attacker-controlled server," Aikido Security researcher Charlie Eriksen said . The nefarious changes are said to have been introduced about a month after the package was ...

Every single day, hackers are finding new ways to crash websites and steal data. But right now, something has changed. Hackers are no longer working alone. They are now using powerful Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools to make their attacks faster, stronger, and much harder to stop. According to recent updates from The Hacker News , bad actors are using AI to find weak spots in systems and launch massive "DDoS attacks" that can take your business offline in seconds. If your website goes down, you lose money, you lose customer trust, and you spend days trying to fix the mess. 👉 Save Your Free Webinar Seat The Old Way of Protection Doesn't Work Anymore In the past, you could set up a simple firewall, update your software, and feel safe. Not anymore. AI-assisted attacks can think and adapt. They don't just hit your front door; they look for hidden entry points, smart APIs, and tiny mistakes in your cloud setup. They do in minutes what used to take human h...

Threat actors have been observed attempting to exploit a recently disclosed security vulnerability in PraisonAI , an open-source multi-agent orchestration framework, within four hours of its public disclosure. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-44338 (CVSS score: 7.3), a case of missing authentication that exposes sensitive endpoints to anyone, potentially allowing an attacker to invoke the API server's protected functionality without a token.  " PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default," according to an advisory released by the maintainers earlier this month. "When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access /agents and trigger the configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat without providing a token." Specifically, the legacy Flask-based API server, src/praisonai/api_server.py, hard-codes AUTH_ENABLED = False and AUTH_TOKEN = None. According to PraisonAI, successful exploitation of the...

Every AI tool, workflow automation, and productivity app your employees connected to Google or Microsoft this year left something behind: a persistent OAuth token with no expiration date, no automatic cleanup, and in most organizations, no one watching it. Your perimeter controls don't see it. Your MFA doesn't stop it. And when an attacker gets hold of one, they don't need a password. OAuth grants don't expire when employees leave. They don't reset when passwords change. And in most organizations, nobody is watching them. The model made sense when a handful of IT-approved apps needed calendar access. It doesn't hold up when every employee is independently wiring AI tools, workflow automations, and productivity apps directly into their Google or Microsoft environment — each one receiving a persistent, scoped token with no automatic expiration and no centralized visibility. That's not a misconfiguration. It's how OAuth is designed to work. The gap is t...