Government sectors in Asia and Africa have been targeted by an active cyber intrusion campaign that delivers to previously undocumented backdoors that leverage legitimate services like Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub for command‑and‑control (C2).
The activity has been codenamed Operation ShadowCloud by Kaspersky. The Russian cybersecurity company said it identified the campaign in early 2026.
"The threat actor behind it is abusing the legitimate MeshAgent utility to drop two brand-new backdoors," Kaspersky researchers Saurabh Sharma and Noushin Shabab said in a two-part analysis. "These implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections."
The modular backdoors, dubbed GraphDoor and GitDoor for their choice of the cloud platform used for C2, enable the download of additional plugins on demand and the execution of shellcode directly in memory to extend their functionality. Traffic between infected systems and the C2 servers is proxied by deploying a modified Erfrp client and Ably messaging service-based plugins.
The starting point of the attack has been traced back to a MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate remote access tool that's used for remote desktop control, command‑line access, and file management. The attack is said to have targeted an unspecified Taiwanese organization.
The exact method by which the utility is installed on the host remains unknown. However, signs point to the "reuse of a prior infection already present on the network," Kaspersky added.
The MeshCentral Agent is configured to contact a hard-coded C2 server ("wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx") and then fetch three payloads staged on the endpoint -
- A legitimate binary used for DLL sideloading (start.exe, pythonw.exe, and zoomit.exe)
- A rogue loader DLL used to unpack and execute the next-stage malware (jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll, and libcef.dll)
- An encrypted file containing the core payload
At least two different DLL loaders have been identified to date, each employing its own method to decode and launch the encrypted backdoor payload by injecting it into the current process's memory.
"Loader (Type 1) employs a hybrid scheme: first running the data through an RC4 stream cipher and then applying an XOR mask, while Loader (Type 2) simplifies the process by using a straight XOR operation alone," Kaspersky noted.
The end goal is to deploy backdoors like GitDoor and GraphDoor, which employ a number of encryption and obfuscation techniques like control flow flattening and nested helper functions to complicate analysis efforts and make it harder to trace genuine execution flow.
GitDoor, as the name implies, uses GitHub for C2. It relies on two distinct repositories for receiving command payloads ("/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo") and uploading the results of the execution ("/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix"). While the Havo repository is public, the Trix repository is private.
The creation date of these repositories suggests that preparations for the campaign have been underway since at least the end of 2024. GitDoor supports 26 commands that allow the backdoor to -
- Perform file management
- Log keystrokes
- Launch a proxy, including using Ably
- Load shellcode to Base64-encoded Common Object File Format (COFF) binaries and terminate the backdoor
The custom shellcode feature is used to download and run different modules that facilitate the following functions -
- Conduct process injection using methods like Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) injection
- Enumerate and manage Windows services
- List files and directories, wipe file contents, and recursively delete a directory
- Conduct network-related activity by displaying active TCP connections and modify firewall rules
- Manage processes, including dumping the memory of the process with a specified process ID into a file and terminating specific processes
- Execute commands using "cmd.exe"
- Enumerate, create, and run scheduled tasks
- Enumeration Windows Registry keys and values recursively and set a value in the Registry
- Extract user information, along with local groups and its members
- Add of a new Windows user account or add a user to a global or a local group
- Record keystrokes to a file ("%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat")
- Dump cookies from Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge directly from the process memory using CookieKatz
- Use Mimikatz to dump credentials from Windows LSASS
- Capture screenshots of the entire screen or a specific window identified by its process ID
- Extract WhatsApp's database decryption key
- Initiate NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled destination
- Calculate system idle time and display the last time a user was active on the host using mouse movement and keyboard input
GraphDoor, on the other hand, opens a named pipe, creates a directory named "Intel_Log" inside the system's Application Data folder, and gathers system information to send back to the attacker.
To establish communications with the C2 server, it authenticates with a malicious application using "login.microsoftonline.com" on port 443 and uses the access token to communicate with the Microsoft Graph API and ultimately stage the data on the SharePoint drive.
The malware then fetches three plugin modules from the server and launches them in parallel to carry out screenshot capture, process listing, and keylogging. It also proceeds to reestablish contact with the SharePoint website to retrieve the commands to be executed on the machine.
The complete list of plugins supported by GraphDoor is as follows -
- kl.ts, to log keystrokes at "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat"
- pr.ts, to list running processes
- scr.ts, to take screenshots of the window that matches a supplied process ID and save them as JPEG images
- moveDir.ts, to move the legitimate executable, the malicious loader DLL, and the encrypted backdoor file to specific target path
- channel.ts, to launch the proxy
- abchannel.ts, to use the Ably messaging service to proxy traffic
- ab2channel.ts, a covert SOCKS5 proxy that tunnels TCP traffic through Ably's Pusher‑compatible WebSocket service
In addition, GraphDoor's custom shellcode capability expands on GitDoor to support two additional commands that allow it to run commands using "cmd.exe," as well as MZ executables.
The identity of the threat actor behind the campaign is unknown, but Kaspersky said it shares some degree of overlap with a China-nexus activity that Sophos tracks under the moniker Bronze Sandcastle. Tactical similarities have been observed with prior campaigns undertaken by FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle (aka BlackTech).
"On several victim systems, these groups shared the same staging directories as the GitDoor backdoor, with their implants deployed within a one-day window of GitDoor deployment," the company concluded. "While this does not prove a direct link, it suggests that a Chinese-speaking group may be developing and/or utilizing the GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors."
"By using cloud-based storage and messaging services, the actors blend in with normal traffic (as cloud API calls to Microsoft Graph, GitHub, and Ably are indistinguishable from legitimate enterprise usage, evading many network-based detections), and enable dynamic payload delivery, where on-demand plug-ins and shellcode are retrieved from cloud repositories, allowing for rapid updates and functional extensions without modifying host files."




