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A newly disclosed vulnerability affecting Intel processors could be abused by an adversary to gain access to sensitive information stored within enclaves and even run arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. The vulnerability ( CVE-2021-0186 , CVSS score: 8.2) was discovered by a group of academics from ETH Zurich, the National University of Singapore, and the Chinese National University of Defense Technology in early May 2021, who used it to stage a confidential data disclosure attack called " SmashEx " that can corrupt private data housed in the enclave and break its integrity. Introduced with Intel's Skylake processors, SGX (short for Software Guard eXtensions) allows developers to run selected application modules in a completely isolated secure compartment of memory, called an enclave or a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which is designed to be protected from processes running at higher privilege levels like the operating system. SGX ensures that data is secure

Code injection attacks, the infamous king of vulnerabilities, have lost the top spot to broken access control as the worst of the worst, and developers need to take notice. In this increasingly chaotic world, there have always been a few constants that people could reliably count on: The sun will rise in the morning and set again at night, Mario will always be cooler than Sonic the Hedgehog, and code injection attacks will always occupy the top spot on the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) list of the  top ten most common  and dangerous vulnerabilities that attackers are actively exploiting. Well, the sun will rise tomorrow, and Mario still has "one-up" on Sonic, but code injection attacks have fallen out of the number one spot on the infamous OWASP list, refreshed in 2021. One of the oldest forms of attacks,  code injection vulnerabilities  have been around almost as long as computer networking. The blanket vulnerability is responsible for a wide range of attacks, inclu

Identities now transcend human boundaries. Within each line of code and every API call lies a non-human identity. These entities act as programmatic access keys, enabling authentication and facilitating interactions among systems and services, which are essential for every API call, database query, or storage account access. As we depend on multi-factor authentication and passwords to safeguard human identities, a pressing question arises: How do we guarantee the security and integrity of these non-human counterparts? How do we authenticate, authorize, and regulate access for entities devoid of life but crucial for the functioning of critical systems? Let's break it down. The challenge Imagine a cloud-native application as a bustling metropolis of tiny neighborhoods known as microservices, all neatly packed into containers. These microservices function akin to diligent worker bees, each diligently performing its designated task, be it processing data, verifying credentials, or

A highly sophisticated adversary named LightBasin has been identified as behind a string of attacks targeting the telecom sector with the goal of collecting "highly specific information" from mobile communication infrastructure, such as subscriber information and call metadata.  "The nature of the data targeted by the actor aligns with information likely to be of significant interest to signals intelligence organizations," researchers from cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike  said  in an analysis published Tuesday. Known to be active as far back as 2016, LightBasin (aka UNC1945) is believed to have compromised 13 telecommunication companies across the world since 2019 by leveraging custom tools and their extensive knowledge of telecommunications protocols for scything through organizations' defenses. The identities of the targeted entities were not disclosed, nor did the findings link the cluster's activity to a specific country. Indeed, a recent incident in

Microsoft has published a new advisory warning of a security bypass vulnerability affecting Surface Pro 3 convertible laptops that could be exploited by an adversary to introduce malicious devices within enterprise networks and defeat the device attestation mechanism. Tracked as  CVE-2021-42299  (CVSS score: 5.6), the issue has been codenamed " TPM Carte Blanche " by Google software engineer Chris Fenner, who is credited with discovering and reporting the attack technique. As of writing, other Surface devices, including the Surface Pro 4 and Surface Book, have been deemed unaffected, although other non-Microsoft machines using a similar BIOS may be vulnerable. "Devices use Platform Configuration Registers ( PCRs ) to record information about device and software configuration to ensure that the boot process is secure," the Windows maker noted in a bulletin. "Windows uses these PCR measurements to determine device health. A vulnerable device can masquerade as

Researchers have disclosed an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the Squirrel programming language that can be abused by attackers to break out of the sandbox restrictions and execute arbitrary code within a SquirrelVM, thus giving a malicious actor complete access to the underlying machine.  Tracked as CVE-2021-41556 , the issue occurs when a game library referred to as Squirrel Engine is used to execute untrusted code and affects stable release branches 3.x and 2.x of Squirrel. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed on August 10, 2021. Squirrel is an open-source, object-oriented programming language that's used for scripting video games and as well as in IoT devices and distributed transaction processing platforms such as Enduro/X. "In a real-world scenario, an attacker could embed a malicious Squirrel script into a community map and distribute it via the trusted Steam Workshop," researchers Simon Scannell and Niklas Breitfeld said in a report shared with

Cybersecurity researchers on Tuesday took the wraps off a mass volume email attack staged by a prolific cybercriminal gang affecting a wide range of industries, with one of its region-specific operations notably targeting Germany and Austria. Enterprise security firm Proofpoint tied the malware campaign with high confidence to  TA505 , which is the name assigned to the financially motivated threat group that's been active in the cybercrime business since at least 2014, and is behind the infamous Dridex banking trojan and an arsenal of other malicious tools such as FlawedAmmyy, FlawedGrace, Neutrino botnet, and Locky ransomware, among others. Cybersecurity company Morphisec Labs is tracking the same attack chain under the independent moniker " MirrorBlast ." The attacks are said to have started as a series of low-volume email waves, delivering only several thousand messages in each phase, before ramping up in late September and as recently as October 13, resulting in

A threat actor, previously known for striking organizations in the energy and telecommunications sectors across the Middle East as early as April 2018, has evolved its malware arsenal to strike two entities in Tunisia. Security researchers at Kaspersky, who presented their findings at the VirusBulletin VB2021 conference earlier this month, attributed the attacks to a group tracked as  Lyceum  (aka Hexane), which was first  publicly documented  in 2019 by Secureworks. "The victims we observed were all high-profile Tunisian organizations, such as telecommunications or aviation companies," researchers Aseel Kayal, Mark Lechtik, and Paul Rascagneres  detailed . "Based on the targeted industries, we assume that the attackers might have been interested in compromising such entities to track the movements and communications of individuals of interest to them." Analysis of the threat actor's toolset has shown that the attacks have shifted from leveraging a combinat