MuddyWater | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

The Iranian threat actor known as MuddyWater has been attributed to a new command-and-control (C2) infrastructure called  DarkBeatC2 , becoming the latest such tool in its arsenal after  SimpleHarm ,  MuddyC3, PhonyC2 , and  MuddyC2Go . "While occasionally switching to a new remote administration tool or changing their C2 framework, MuddyWater's methods remain constant," Deep Instinct security researcher Simon Kenin  said  in a technical report published last week. MuddyWater, also called Boggy Serpens, Mango Sandstorm, and TA450, is assessed to be affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). It's known to be active since at least 2017, orchestrating spear-phishing attacks that lead to the deployment of various legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions on compromised systems. Prior findings from Microsoft show that the group has ties with another Iranian threat activity cluster tracked as  Storm-1084  (aka DarkBit), with t

The Iran-affiliated threat actor tracked as  MuddyWater  (aka Mango Sandstorm or TA450) has been linked to a new phishing campaign in March 2024 that aims to deliver a legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solution called Atera. The activity, which took place from March 7 through the week of March 11, targeted Israeli entities spanning global manufacturing, technology, and information security sectors, Proofpoint said. "TA450 sent emails with PDF attachments that contained malicious links," the enterprise security firm  said . "While this method is not foreign to TA450, the threat actor has more recently relied on including malicious links directly in email message bodies instead of adding in this extra step." MuddyWater has been attributed to attacks directed against Israeli organizations since late October 2023, with prior findings from Deep Instinct  uncovering  the threat actor's use of another remote administration tool from N-able. This i

Identities now transcend human boundaries. Within each line of code and every API call lies a non-human identity. These entities act as programmatic access keys, enabling authentication and facilitating interactions among systems and services, which are essential for every API call, database query, or storage account access. As we depend on multi-factor authentication and passwords to safeguard human identities, a pressing question arises: How do we guarantee the security and integrity of these non-human counterparts? How do we authenticate, authorize, and regulate access for entities devoid of life but crucial for the functioning of critical systems? Let's break it down. The challenge Imagine a cloud-native application as a bustling metropolis of tiny neighborhoods known as microservices, all neatly packed into containers. These microservices function akin to diligent worker bees, each diligently performing its designated task, be it processing data, verifying credentials, or

The Iranian nation-state actor known as  MuddyWater  has leveraged a newly discovered command-and-control (C2) framework called MuddyC2Go in its attacks on the telecommunications sector in Egypt, Sudan, and Tanzania. The Symantec Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom, is  tracking  the activity under the name Seedworm, which is also tracked under the monikers Boggy Serpens, Cobalt Ulster, Earth Vetala, ITG17, Mango Sandstorm (formerly Mercury), Static Kitten, TEMP.Zagros, and Yellow Nix. Active since at least 2017,  MuddyWater  is assessed to be affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), primarily singling out entities in the Middle East. The cyber espionage group's use of  MuddyC2Go  was first highlighted by Deep Instinct last month, describing it as a Golang-based replacement for  PhonyC2 , itself a successor to MuddyC3. However, there is evidence to suggest that it may have been employed as early as 2020. While the full extent of MuddyC2Go'

The Iranian state-sponsored group dubbed MuddyWater has been attributed to a previously unseen command-and-control (C2) framework called  PhonyC2  that's been put to use by the actor since 2021. Evidence shows that the custom made, actively developed framework has been leveraged in the  February 2023 attack on Technion , an Israeli research institute, cybersecurity firm Deep Instinct said in a report shared with The Hacker News. What's more, additional links have been unearthed between the Python 3-based program and other attacks carried out by MuddyWater, including the  ongoing exploitation of PaperCut servers . "It is structurally and functionally similar to  MuddyC3 , a previous MuddyWater  custom C2 framework  that was written in Python 2," security researcher Simon Kenin said. "MuddyWater is continuously updating the PhonyC2 framework and changing TTPs to avoid detection." MuddyWater, also known as Mango Sandstorm (previously Mercury), is a cyber

Iranian state-sponsored actors are leaving no stone unturned to exploit unpatched systems running Log4j to target Israeli entities, indicating the vulnerability's  long tail  for remediation. Microsoft attributed the latest set of activities to the  umbrella threat group  tracked as  MuddyWater  (aka Cobalt Ulster, Mercury, Seedworm, or Static Kitten), which is  linked  to the Iranian intelligence apparatus, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The attacks are notable for using SysAid Server instances unsecured against the  Log4Shell flaw  as a vector for initial access,  marking  a  departure  from the actors' pattern of leveraging VMware applications for breaching target environments. "After gaining access, Mercury establishes persistence, dumps credentials, and moves laterally within the targeted organization using both custom and well-known hacking tools, as well as built-in operating system tools for its hands-on-keyboard attack," Microsoft  said . The tech gia

The Iranian state-sponsored threat actor known as MuddyWater has been attributed to a new swarm of attacks targeting Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula with the goal of deploying remote access trojans (RATs) on compromised systems. "The MuddyWater supergroup is highly motivated and can use unauthorized access to conduct espionage, intellectual property theft, and deploy ransomware and destructive malware in an enterprise," Cisco Talos researchers Asheer Malhotra, Vitor Ventura, and Arnaud Zobec  said  in a report published today. The group, which has been active since at least 2017, is known for its attacks on various sectors that help further advance Iran's geopolitical and national security objectives. In January 2022, the U.S. Cyber Command attributed the actor to the country's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). MuddyWater is also believed to be a "conglomerate of  multiple teams  operating independently rather than a single threat actor group,&q

Cybersecurity agencies from the U.K. and the U.S. have laid bare a new malware used by the Iranian government-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group in attacks targeting government and commercial networks worldwide. "MuddyWater actors are positioned both to provide stolen data and accesses to the Iranian government and to share these with other malicious cyber actors," the agencies  said . The joint advisory comes courtesy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and the U.K.'s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). The cyberespionage actor was  outed this year  as conducting malicious operations as part of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) targeting a wide range of government and private-sector organizations, including telecommunications, defense, local government, and oil and natural gas sectors, in Asia, Afric

Details have emerged about a previously undocumented malware campaign undertaken by the Iranian MuddyWater advanced persistent threat (APT) group targeting Turkish private organizations and governmental institutions. "This campaign utilizes malicious PDFs, XLS files and Windows executables to deploy malicious PowerShell-based downloaders acting as initial footholds into the target's enterprise," Cisco Talos researchers Asheer Malhotra and Vitor Ventura  said  in a newly published report. The  development  comes as the U.S. Cyber Command, earlier this month,  linked the APT  to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The intrusions, which are believed to have been orchestrated as recently as November 2021, were directed against Turkish government entities, including the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey ( TÜBİTAK ), using weaponized Excel documents and PDF files hosted on attacker-controlled or media-sharing websites. These mal