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Incapsula security study reveals how a simple neglect in managing the administrative password of a small UK site was quickly exploited by Botnet shepherds operating obscurely out of Turkey to hurl large amounts of traffic at American banks. If you've been following the news, you are probably aware of a wave of DDoS attacks that recently hit several major U.S. banks. Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, a hacker group that claimed responsibility for these attacks, declared them to be a retaliation for an anti-Islam video that mocked the Prophet Muhammad and a part of the on-going "Operation Ababil." As the reports of the attack started to roll in, Incapsula security team was able to uncover one of the secret foot-soldiers behind the assault: a compromised general-interest UK-based website that was trying to hurl large chunks of junk traffic at three of the world's largest financial institutions (PNC, HSBC and Fifth Third Bank). At On the eve of the attack, this website sud

Trojan.Stabuniq geographic distribution by unique IP address Security researchers from Symantec have identified a new Trojan that appears to be targeting financial institutions. Dubbed Trojan.Stabuniq , the malware has been collecting information from infected systems potentially for the preparation of a more damaging attack. According to researchers , roughly 40 IP addresses infected with the Stabuniq Trojan, 40% per cent belong to financial institutions who are mostly based in Chicago and New York. The malware appears to be spread by a phishing attack through spam e-mail containing a link to the address of a server hosting a Web exploit toolkit . Such toolkits are commonly used to silently install malware on Web users' computers by exploiting vulnerabilities in outdated browser plug-ins like Flash Player , Adobe Reader , or Java. These attacks can be very simple, such as a written email from a prince in Nigeria asking for bank account information. Once in

Identities now transcend human boundaries. Within each line of code and every API call lies a non-human identity. These entities act as programmatic access keys, enabling authentication and facilitating interactions among systems and services, which are essential for every API call, database query, or storage account access. As we depend on multi-factor authentication and passwords to safeguard human identities, a pressing question arises: How do we guarantee the security and integrity of these non-human counterparts? How do we authenticate, authorize, and regulate access for entities devoid of life but crucial for the functioning of critical systems? Let's break it down. The challenge Imagine a cloud-native application as a bustling metropolis of tiny neighborhoods known as microservices, all neatly packed into containers. These microservices function akin to diligent worker bees, each diligently performing its designated task, be it processing data, verifying credentials, or