IP Camera software | Breaking Cybersecurity News | The Hacker News

Cisco Systems has agreed to pay $8.6 million to settle a lawsuit that accused the company of knowingly selling video surveillance system containing severe security vulnerabilities to the U.S. federal and state government agencies. It's believed to be the first payout on a ' False Claims Act ' case over failure to meet cybersecurity standards. The lawsuit began eight years ago, in the year 2011, when Cisco subcontractor turned whistleblower, James Glenn, accused Cisco of continue selling a video surveillance technology to federal agencies even after knowing that the software was vulnerable to multiple security flaws. According to the court documents seen by The Hacker News, Glenn and one of his colleagues discovered multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Video Surveillance Manager (VSM) suite in September 2008 and tried to report them to the company in October 2008. Cisco Video Surveillance Manager (VSM) suite allows customers to manage multiple video cameras at different

Security researchers have discovered over a dozen of vulnerabilities in tens of thousands of web-connected cameras that can not be protected just by changing their default credentials. Vulnerabilities found in two models of IP cameras from China-based manufacturer Foscam allow attackers to take over the camera, view video feeds, and, in some cases, even gain access to other devices connected to a local network. Researchers at security firm F-Secure discovered 18 vulnerabilities in two camera models — one sold under the Foscam C2 and other under Opticam i5 HD brand — that are still unpatched despite the company was informed several months ago. In addition to the Foscam and Opticam brands, F-Secure also said the vulnerabilities were likely to exist in 14 other brands that use Foscam internals, including Chacon, 7links, Netis, Turbox, Thomson, Novodio, Nexxt, Ambientcam, Technaxx, Qcam, Ivue, Ebode and Sab. The flaws discovered in the IP cameras includes: Insecure default cr

Identities now transcend human boundaries. Within each line of code and every API call lies a non-human identity. These entities act as programmatic access keys, enabling authentication and facilitating interactions among systems and services, which are essential for every API call, database query, or storage account access. As we depend on multi-factor authentication and passwords to safeguard human identities, a pressing question arises: How do we guarantee the security and integrity of these non-human counterparts? How do we authenticate, authorize, and regulate access for entities devoid of life but crucial for the functioning of critical systems? Let's break it down. The challenge Imagine a cloud-native application as a bustling metropolis of tiny neighborhoods known as microservices, all neatly packed into containers. These microservices function akin to diligent worker bees, each diligently performing its designated task, be it processing data, verifying credentials, or